



शांता महान्तो निवसन्ति संतो वसन्तवल्लोकहितं चरन्तः ।

The great and peaceful ones live regenerating the world like the coming of spring.

— विवेकचूडामणि (*Crest-Jewel of Wisdom*)

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THE LOTUS — FLOWER OF POWER

Nature speaks in symbols and in signs—WHITTIER.

The study of the hidden meaning in every religious and profane legend, of whatsoever nation, large or small—preëminently the traditions of the East—occupied the greater portion of the life of H. P. Blavatsky. She was one of those who remain convinced that no mythological story, no traditional event in the folk-lore of a people has ever been, at any time, pure fiction, but that every one of such narratives has an actual historical lining to it. She held that the religious and esoteric history of every nation was embedded in symbols. A parable is a spoken symbol: a fiction or a fable as some think; an allegorical representation of life realities, events and facts, according to the esoteric philosophy. Even fairy tales

do not exclusively belong to the nursery; and though few, there have been those who have comprehended their hidden meaning and tried to explain it. "The Myths" says Horace in his *Ars Poetica* "have been invented by wise men to strengthen the laws and teach moral truths"; therefore Horace endeavoured to make clear the very spirit and essence of the ancient myths. Plutarch tells us that he was initiated into the secret mysteries of Dionysus, and writing to a colleague on the state of the soul after death he said that "the mystic symbols are well known to us who belong to the 'brotherhood'".

H. P. Blavatsky took pains to explain many parables, myths, and symbols in her writings. That

part of her instruction has not been brought out in our pages, because the modern mind is more literal than poetic, and generally disdains to treat fantasy and fairy lore seriously. But this month we have an opportunity. On the 8th of May every year Theosophists commemorate the anniversary of the death of H. P. Blavatsky, who expressed a wish ere her passing that it should be called White Lotus Day, as the flower best symbolized her life and mission. In her *Secret Doctrine* she devotes a whole section of the book to the exposition of symbols and among them is the Lotus. She has turned the key of interpretation several times; below we select two passages for study and reflection.

There are no ancient symbols, without a deep and philosophical meaning attached to them; their importance and significance increasing with their antiquity. Such is the LOTUS. It is the flower sacred to nature and her Gods, and represents the abstract and the Concrete Universes, standing as the emblem of the productive powers of both spiritual and physical nature. It was held sacred from the remotest antiquity by the Aryan Hindus, the Egyptians, and the Buddhists after them; revered in China and Japan, and adopted as a Christian emblem by the Greek and Latin Churches, who made of it a messenger as the Christians do now, who replace it with the water lily. It had, and still has, its mystic meaning which

is identical with every nation on the earth. *The Secret Doctrine*, I. 379.

The Lotus, or Padma, is, moreover, a very ancient and favourite simile for the Kosmos itself, and also for man. The popular reasons given are, firstly, the fact just mentioned, that the Lotus-seed contains within itself a perfect miniature of the future plant, which typifies the fact that the spiritual prototypes of all things exist in the immaterial world before those things become materialized on Earth. Secondly, the fact that the Lotus plant grows up through the water, having its root in the Ilus, or mud, and spreading its flower in the air above. The Lotus thus typifies the life of man and also that of the Kosmos; for the Secret Doctrine teaches that the elements of both are the same, and that both are developing in the same direction. The root of the Lotus sunk in the mud represents material life, the stalk passing up through the water typifies existence in the astral world, and the flower floating on the water and opening to the sky is emblematical of spiritual being. (*Ibid.*, I, 57-58)

As the Lotus is symbolic of human evolution, human progression and perfection, in the highest aspect the Sacred Lotus represents the Holy of Holies—the Heart of Man. To this the true Buddhist is taught to direct his mind when he repeats: “Aum Mani Padme Hum”—“Oh! the Jewel in the Lotus”. The true esotericist is one who penetrates into the very kernel of matter and regards the soul of things where the profane but perceives the external work of form.

ON HEARING

[B. M. is an old-world man living by his old-world methods in our era. We are fortunate in having secured a few reports of his talks to his intimate friends. The *Bhagavad-Gita* is the book he has mastered through long years of study and meditation; but further, having lived according to its tenets more successfully than is generally possible, his thoughts breathe a peculiar fragrance. The papers have been translated from the vernacular: it should be understood that they are not literal translations, and the translator has adhered more to ideas and principles than to words. Although B. M. knows English, his inspiration becomes impeded in employing that medium of expression and so he prefers not to use it.—EDS.]

श्रोतव्यस्य श्रुतस्य च ॥

This expression occurs (*Gita* II. 52) in Krishna's exposition of Buddhi Yoga, the method of purifying buddhi, the power of discernment. This buddhi is translated as intellect, mind, heart; but it is a faculty of the lower man and must not be confused with Buddhi of the inner and higher man which Buddhi is a ray of Mahabuddhi, or Mahat, the Universal Mind.

Our understanding-discernment is clouded. Illusion (*maya*), delusion (*moha*), ever envelop the man. Buddhi-Yoga frees us from this bondage. Several are the marks of this bondage. Among them is this one—about what is heard and what remains to be heard. But every mark of bondage has within it the power to remove that bondage. The creator of the bondage and the maker of Karma is stronger than the bondage or the Karma.

Sight is regarded as the instrument of perception. Peoples' beliefs are based on what is seen, and those who believe on hearsay are looked down upon. That is right, for people should not act on hearsay. But to depend on our sight and say “I believe be-

cause I see,” is also wrong. All belief is to be discouraged, whether it is due to hearing or to seeing.

Come to knowledge. We find that in modern science, observation, *i.e.*, sight, precedes deduction, theory, and report. When an experimenter's sight is satisfied he speaks, and on his report other scientists observe, and then the world hears and repeats—“science teaches.” But this is unsatisfactory; for again and again science contradicts itself.

Turn to the world of Maharishis and Mahatmas. Their Divine Science, Brahma-Vidya, describes the evolution of the universe as based on Sound.

According to these Sages, evolution is an unfoldment and a procession, really speaking an unfolding-procession. The order is—Life as basic, immovable and immortal Spirit; then, Life as creative energy (*Daiviprakriti*); and then Life as ever-breaking, ever-multiplying matter (*Mulaprakriti*). All three are Life, or Life in three states—the root-states of what we call gaseous, liquid and solid conditions of

matter. All that is gaseous corresponds to spirit, all that is liquid corresponds to energy, all that is solid corresponds to matter. Each of these states is a wave of Life in which spirit-beings, energy-beings, matter-beings, emerge as a procession. The differentiating power, that which enables us to cognize the One as three,—and Life cannot be cognized otherwise,—is Sound. Sound-vibration (*nāda-dhvani*), condensing or materializing, forms stars; sound inherent in each orb produces forms belonging to that orb—down to the very atoms. *Shabda-Brahman* is Word-God, *i.e.*, the universe as a Living-Word. The music of the spheres is a fact; it is heard, not seen.

Again, these old Sages teach that of all our senses, that of hearing unfolded first; the human body evolved the ear as the primary organ; therefore it is said that man hears and should hear before he sees. Adopting the order of Nature these Sages, in Their system of education, put sound before sight—that which is heard before that which is seen.

The Vedas were heard, then repeated, then recorded. It is said that if one wants to understand fully the Vedas, he must hear them. Reading may yield a meaning for the mind, but hearing brings a meaning for buddhi, heart or intellect.

The order to be observed in gaining knowledge is—(1) Hear, (2) Memorize, (3) Contemplate, (4) Understand, and (5) Teach. In our Holy Order these are the

five steps. What do we hear? *Shruti*, Revelation; when that is memorized we have what is called *Smriti*, Tradition; these two give the subject for, and become the cause of, contemplation; then understanding results; when one has understood through meditation on that which was memorized and heard, then he is to teach; and that fifth step is part of learning. Even understanding is insufficient; when all that is understood is repeated for the benefit of others, then is the gaining of knowledge completed.

When the Sages laid the foundation of Society in ancient and glorious India, They devised numerous rituals; each ceremony was a reminder to mortals, and told them of some spiritual truth. The Thread ceremony dramatized this fact, for during that rite is whispered into the ear of the boy the sacred text which is his subject of meditation and his guide in life. He followed the same order: he heard, memorized, contemplated, understood and taught.

This is the real order. Aspirants must never try to see or understand that which they have not heard. Prying and curiosity are undesirable; to try to see and understand that about which we have not heard, invariably proves fatal; even were it not dangerous, such an habit delays the securing of true knowledge; but it is dangerous, for we come under the influence of foreign evil influences.

The true Gurus have a definite

way of training Their chelas. The five steps are purificatory; they cleanse the heart or buddhi, and adjust the vision of the chela. Just as for ordinary seeing the right focusing of the eyes is essential, so also for seeing ideas; the chela must learn the right focusing of his heart, otherwise intuition will not function. This adjustment of inner vision, which enables the chela to see truths, is made through his ear. Those who try to see without prior hearing are deluded psychics. Even when they are successful in rending the visible veil, they do not understand what they see, and what they see is like unto what the poor man whose eyes are out of focus sees. Never attempt to investigate or experiment with the invisible, unless the Guru's word on the subject has been heard. There is never a new discovery in the realm of knowledge; all intellects discover the same facts and truths; each aspirant has to learn this—in theory first, and then by practice.

There are truths which are already heard and those which are

yet to be heard; therefore, this method and these rules do not only apply to aspirants and disciples, but belong to *Guru-parampara*—the whole chain of Gurus. A Rishi is one who having heard the Vedas chants them for the benefit of the world. Some doctrines are already taught to us, others are yet to be taught. We must not allow ourselves to be snared by this pair, any more than by any other pair. How? We must not be proud of what we know, nor be anxious that others shall accept our knowledge; on the other hand, we must not be impatient about what we have still to learn, nor must we attempt to turn another page of the Book of Wisdom. That Book is a Living Book, and its pages turn by themselves for each learner. Our faith in what has been heard and what has been taught is tested through our attitude to what shall be heard, to doctrines yet to be taught. Detachment about gaining Wisdom is a virtue necessary in the practice of *Buddhi-Yoga*—the Path of Purifying the Heart.

B. M.

O Disciple, unless the flesh is passive, head cool, the Soul as firm and pure as flaming diamond, the radiance will not reach the CHAMBER, its sunlight will not warm the heart, nor will the mystic sounds of the Akasic heights reach the ear, however eager, at the initial stage.

—THE VOICE OF THE SILENCE

THE NEXT STEP FORWARD

[J. D. Beresford began to write for publication over a quarter of a century ago, and has to his credit novels, dramas and essays which have entertained and instructed many. His association with THE ARYAN PATH, since its inception, has led him to study H. P. Blavatsky's scientific philosophy about which he writes, most appropriately, this month.—EDS.]

In the November number of THE ARYAN PATH, I had occasion to quote M. Bergson as saying apropos of the two sources of Morality and Religion, that "religion's representations of death are nature's defensive reactions against the representation by the intelligence of a discouraging, unforeseen latitude between the initiative taken and the effect desired". At the head of this article a preliminary note was printed advising readers to compare the substance of this and other relevant statements of M. Bergson's with the Theosophical view of the cycle of evolution, and more particularly with H. P. Blavatsky's statement with regard to the acquisition of individuality, "first by natural impulse, and then by self-induced and self-devised efforts—checked by karma. . . ."

Now this suggested comparison seems to me of peculiar significance not only to Theosophists but to all those interested in the development of the Spirit of man, a development which finds its most illuminating commentary in his various religions. Without attempting, therefore, to enter into the difficult problems set by a consideration of the intricate relations between the Manas (Mind)

and the lower principles,* I propose to examine briefly two aspects of this development which seem to me to suggest a highly important indication of the step even now being taken between the dogmatic religions and the principles and beliefs that will presently supersede them.

Let us begin by going back to the primitive rites and superstitions indicated in the quotation given above, as illustrating the lowest point of the cycle. In this stage the influence of intelligence is very small as compared with that of the lower principles, and one of the most dominant motives of human action and belief is fear. In the animal world this motive finds no compensation through the intelligence. The animal reaction, whether displayed in flight, anger or a paralysis of the will, is a pure reflex. Man at his most primitive exhibits, in addition, another response: he seeks also to conquer certain fears, death among them, by an explanation, and in this attempt is to be found the first seeds of religion and science.

The earliest expressions of this attempted explanation are very much alike in principle. In the vast mysterious world of life that continually presents phenomena

outside the range of common experience, primitive man found himself beset with spiritual as well as bodily terrors, and it became necessary for him to account for them. Let us take, as a familiar illustration, an eclipse of the sun. As a terrifying phenomenon of great rarity this was completely beyond any rational explanation he could imagine, but it was one that had to be accounted for by some relation of it to man's defensive code of belief. He therefore postulated a dragon, one of his imagined spirits of the air, as the cause of the danger, and elaborated that simple fantasy, exactly as a modern child will do, by further postulating the dragon in question as a timorous creature that might be scared from its fell purpose of swallowing the sun by incantations and the violent beating of gongs. We may note in passing that as this procedure was invariably effective, the simple "post hoc ergo propter hoc" logic of the savage definitely establishes the theory as proved fact,—a form of reasoning that we have not, as yet, entirely outgrown.

Next, taking a long step forward, we find that the influence of agriculture on the quickening of civilisation—that is to say the formation of relatively permanent communities tied to a particular location by the need to sow, tend and harvest their crops,—produced a wonderful accumulation of rites and superstitions of a placatory tendency. Man in Early Greece, for example, conceived a whole

pantheon of gods to whom he attributed all power to control the ways of nature. The attitude here is practically the same as that shown by the savage. Humanity is faced by the realisation of its own impotence. The ways of nature are terrifying and inexplicable. Therefore it becomes essential as a measure of self-protection to invent over-riding controllers of destiny who may be placated by worship and service.

Between these two stages we can trace a slight advance in the development both of natural impulse and of the "self-induced and self-devised efforts" to fulfil them. Though safety is still the prevailing factor,—the need to find defence against the unknown by explaining it away,—the element of sacrifice is now taking a new shape, inasmuch as it is now clearly recognised as a means to an end. The self-discipline of totemism survives and extends to other relations; and the idea of the scapegoat in diverse forms has begun to take shape as an escape from destiny by vicarious sacrifice.

In such a brief summary as this, however, it must be understood that the trace I am following is selected for the sake of illustration and is chronological only in a restricted sense. Many centuries before the Greek civilisation of, say, 800 B. C., the Egyptian religion influenced by a few stray teachings of the Ancient Wisdom had submitted its far more elaborate, and in some cases truly esoteric explanations

* See in this connection *The Key to Theosophy*, Chapter VI.

of the mysteries of man's being. But as nearly all indication of the beliefs of this and other Eastern civilisations becomes submerged in the next stage I propose to treat, the omission does not break the continuity of the argument. In the larger history of mankind, we find that the Ancient Wisdom is always represented, but its influence upon the mass of mankind is directly proportional to the degree of development attained in each cycle.

We come now to the third great movement, exemplified in the various forms of Christianity which still dominate Western thought. The "defensive reactions" are still well to the forefront, but the "natural impulse" discovers an immensely important new trend in the postulation of altruism as an essential value in any religious creed.

To take the defensive reactions first, it is evident that the teaching of the Christian Churches still follows in one respect the primitive function of providing an explanation. In this twentieth century our daily fears have little in common with those of the savage. The protection afforded by living in communities governed by a recognition of the altruistic principle has given us confidence and something of the courage of those who have never known danger. But the great threat of death is far more clearly visualised and it is the business of religion now to provide a full and particular account of it, just as it was the business of the witch doctors

to account for an eclipse of the sun.

The average man and woman of the present day cannot, in fact, endure the mystery of the great riddles of existence with any greater fortitude than their primitive ancestors. Those riddles are, by hypothesis, outside the domain of science which can never hope to answer them by any inductive process of examination or argument. Wherefore the great mass of the people demands and receives from its religious teachers compact and comprehensive, though frequently inconsistent, answers to such critical questions as: What is Man? Whence does he come? and whither is he bound? Thus relieved of the burden of seeking a personal explanation, and assured that the future is safe on certain comparatively easy terms, the modern man and woman may go about the business of common life as if the rewards and satisfactions of the present world were the only matters of real importance. The Churches, in short, have merely provided another and rather more reasonable explanation of the birth, life, death cycle, based like the earlier theories upon a slowly developing tradition; and thereby administer an anodyne to deaden the fears of those minds which are not yet ready to face the eternal mysteries. If we can relegate all the inexplicable riddles of life and matter to the incomprehensible designs of an unknowable God, we are, it is understood, relieved from further responsibility.

Nevertheless, the "natural impulse" of our text continues to evolve and demand new explanations. Even science has played its part in the stimulation of our curiosity. She can tell us no more than could the primitive savage why, for example, an acorn produces always an oak and not an elm or a beech; but if she is unable to explain any of the fundamental mysteries, she is continually drawing our attention to them. Indeed, I submit that for the intelligent man of to-day, the world poses far more and far deeper mysteries than those which perplexed and intimidated our primitive ancestors.

What, then, is the nature of that next step forward which I began by suggesting as being imminent in the world of to-day? For many of us, the cut and dried explanation of the Christian Churches appears at last little less childish than the beliefs of polytheism or of still more primitive eschatologies. Yet we have by no means passed the stage at which we urgently need some kind of explanation of man's place in the Universe. The new account must cover all kinds of problems that Christianity does not even attempt to solve. We may not expect definitive and final answers to all our questions. But we do demand that such as can be given should rise above the level of fantasy and superstition, to satisfy the intelligence and, most important of all, awaken those responses which have been developed in us by

age-old experience.

Such an account I find in *The Secret Doctrine*. It does not attempt to solve all the mysteries, nor to give a complete explanation of man's relation to eternity. There is a final and complete reason why it cannot do these things, and this is that if such an explanation could be given, we should not be able to understand it. We are reaching a stage at which deeper esoteric knowledge can be comprehended, but beyond that are many others which can be attained only by a slow process of self-development and initiation.

But *The Secret Doctrine* definitely opens out the way to beliefs that accord with the new development of thought. H. P. Blavatsky's elucidation of man's origin is as far ahead of the old creation myths,—although, in one sense, it includes and explains them,—as the modern astronomer's account of the stellar universe is ahead of the Ptolemaic. This analogy also holds good in another respect. For just as recent astronomical theories hold an element of profound mystery that was lacking in the anthropocentric theories of the Ptolemaists, so also does H. P. Blavatsky's account of man's origin and destiny leave us with a feeling of the profoundest awe and wonder.

In conclusion, I submit that the new step in development for which the world is almost ready, marks a radical change in religious thought. In the past, as I have endeavoured to show, man-

kind in the mass has demanded, and received, a complete and materially satisfying account of his relation to God and the Cosmos. Now, with a new equipment and a new courage, he is prepared to put away the fantasies of childhood and accept the sterner teachings of adolescence. He has to recognise himself not as the cherished, protected member of a small family, but as a pilgrim soul whose origin he cannot trace and for whose destiny he is primarily responsible.

J. D. BERESFORD

"When thou prayest, thou shalt not be as the hypocrites are . . . but enter into thine inner chamber and having shut thy door, pray to thy Father which is in secret." (Matt. vi.) Our Father is within us "in Secret," our 7th principle, in the "inner chamber" of our Soul perception. "The Kingdom of Heaven" and of God "is within us" says Jesus, not outside. Why are Christians so absolutely blind to the self-evident meaning of the words of wisdom they delight in mechanically repeating?

Man ought to be ever striving to help the divine evolution of *Ideas*, by becoming to the best of his ability a co-worker with nature in the cyclic task. The ever unknowable and incognizable *Karana* alone, the Causeless Cause of all causes, should have its shrine and altar on the holy and ever untrodden ground of our heart—invisible, intangible, unmentioned, save through "the still small voice" of our spiritual consciousness. Those who worship before it, ought to do so in the silence and the sanctified solitude of their Souls; making their spirit the sole mediator between them and the *Universal Spirit*, their good actions the only priests, and their sinful intentions the only visible and objective sacrificial victims to the *Presence*.

—H. P. BLAVATSKY, *The Secret Doctrine*, Vol. I, p. 280.

POLITICAL SCIENCE IN OLD INDIA

[Below we print three articles which present the old Hindu views on three of the vital subjects affecting every Government in the world. The first deals with the internal economic structure of a nation; the second with the policy of the rulers of a conquered State towards their subject peoples; the third with the problem of internationalism. All three also show that ancient India was not backward in practical affairs because it was philosophically so greatly advanced.—EDS.]

I

THE ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF HINDU THOUGHT

[Miss Eleanor M. Hough, Ph. D., is the author of *The Co-operative Movement in India*. In his Introduction to that volume the Rt. Hon. Sir Horace Plunkett wrote of Dr. Hough thus:—

In December last (1931) a young American lady, passing through London on her way from India to the United States, called upon me. She told me that she had written a book upon "The Co-operative Movement in India," and that if I would write a brief Introduction she would be greatly obliged. She was unknown to me; I was in poor health and in hopeless arrears with some literary work I had hoped to do. She explained that she had spent the greater part of the year in India; that her book was a "thesis" required for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy at the George Washington University; and that her request was prompted by the frequent evidences, brought to her notice in the course of her Indian studies, of my keen interest in her subject. I could not do more than promise to consider her request. She left me a ponderous tome in typescript and a most favourable impression of my strange visitor. With thanks in anticipation and a charming courtesy, she wished me better health and was gone. From her ship she wrote that an eminent firm of London publishers had taken her book and would send me the proofs. These came in due course, together with an admirable Fore-word by Professor Kaji, which seemed to take all the wind out of my sails. Nevertheless, I set to work upon the formidable task of reading the book, and I simply could not put it down.]

Of economic theory in the modern sense we find comparatively little in the ancient Hindu literature, but there are many references to economic institutions, from which we can reconstruct the economic structure of ancient India and the conditions under which its people lived.

Our primary sources are the ancient ethical codes, the *Laws of Manu*, which is the earliest surviving Aryan code, the *Institutes of Vishnu*, and *The Sacred Laws of the Aryas as Taught in the Schools of Apastamba, Vasishtha, Gautama, and Baudhâyana*. Some of the gems of ancient Indian literature also throw con-

siderable incidental light on the subject: the *Vedas*, the *Upanishads*, the *Mahabharata*, the *Arthashastra* of Kautilya, minister of Chandra Gupta, who ruled in the brilliant period of Hindu history in the third and fourth centuries B. C., the collection of wise and quaint animal fables in the *Hitopadesa*, and the *Dhammapada*, in which are preserved the sayings of Gautama Buddha.

A brief consideration of the philosophical basis of ancient Aryan thought may help us to understand their economic conditions rooted in that soil. The unity of all life is a fundamental concept of their philosophy.

He . . . who by the similitude found in himself seeth but one essence in all things, whether they be evil or good, is considered to be the most excellent devotee.*

From this follows the sacredness of life and the religious sanction for conduct. To the devout Hindu every act is a sacrament.

Whatever thou doest . . . whatever thou eatest, whatever thou sacrificest, whatever thou givest, whatever mortification thou performest, commit each unto me.†

Perfection is held out as the goal of human endeavour, to be reached by effort through many lives, in which each reaps the consequences, good or bad, of his own actions.

The ancient Hindus' idea of value was the antithesis of modern western notions. All of this material universe, they taught, is unreal because impermanent.

Look upon the world as a bubble, look upon it as a mirage: the king of death does not see him who thus looks down upon the world.‡

When all desires that dwell in his heart cease, then the mortal becomes immortal, and obtains Brahman.§

He who becomes attached to material objects is held not to be a free man.

Wise people do not call that a strong fetter which is made of iron, wood, or

hemp; far stronger is the care of precious stones and rings, for sons and a wife.¶

Contentment with little is listed in the *Laws of Manu* as one of the ten modes of subsistence permitted to all men in times of distress.§

But, in spite of the slight esteem in which material objects are to be held, Hindu philosophy does not sanction idling.

If anything is to be done, let a man do it, let him attack it vigorously!***

Men rise, not by chance or nature, but by exertions.††

Action, then, is recognized as necessary, but it must be disinterested action, performed as duty and without regard to its consequences.

A man enjoyeth not freedom from action from the non-commencement of that which he hath to do; nor doth he obtain happiness from a total abandonment of action But he who having subdued all his passions performeth with his active faculties all the duties of life, unconcerned as to their result, is to be esteemed.‡‡

On these foundations an advanced civilization was reared. "India in the olden times was not a land of jungles and wastes, but a land of abundant agriculture, brisk trade, numerous arts and crafts, convenient roads and trade-routes with wells and rest-houses, shade-giving groves and fruit-bearing

trees at regular intervals, and prosperous cities. The Greek writers on Alexander's campaigns speak of 2,000 regular towns in the Panjāb alone."* There were two great universities in India in the sixth century B. C., at Kāsi and Takshasilā.†

Megasthenes, ambassador of the Greek King Seleucus of Bactria to the court of Asoka in the fourth century B. C., reported municipal government in India well organized, with different groups of officials regulating industry and trade, keeping vital statistics, and collecting taxes.‡

The village was ever the major political unit. The Indian village has been called "the original type, the first germ, of all the divisions of rural and civic society in medieval and modern Europe".§ It was almost self-sufficing, with considerable division of labour among its members, each recompensed by the services of his fellow villagers.¶

Administrative committees to maintain public halls, temples, tanks, rest-houses, and wells for travellers, to construct water-courses and places of worship, to protect against invasion and to relieve the distressed§ were elect-

ed by the people of the whole village, ballots being drawn from a pot.** Age and property as well as educational restrictions for committee membership were carefully laid down.†† Villages were largely autonomous and the activities of the central government were confined chiefly to protecting life and property and collecting the revenue.‡‡

The Public Works Department in the third century B. C., however, had charge of working mines; opening irrigation works; establishing factories; maintaining preserves and grazing grounds, highways of commerce, waterways, land-routes, and other facilities for communication; establishing markets and stores; constructing embankments, dams, and bridges; planting fruit and flower trees and medicinal plants; and protecting the disabled, helpless, and infirm.§§

Physicians were required to report to the Government each case of contagious disease.¶¶ They were punished for malpractice and warned against "gathering experience" at the cost of lives of their patients.*** Sanitary regulations were strict.

The four main castes corres-

* *Bhagavad-Gita*, VI : 32.

† *Ibid.*, IX : 27.

‡ *Dhammapada*, 170.

§ *The Sacred Books and Early Literature of the East (Katha Upanishad)*, p. 110.

¶ *Dhammapada*, 345.

§ *Laws of Manu*, p. 427.

** *Dhammapada*, 313.

†† *The Sacred Books and Early Literature of the East (Hitopadesa)* p. 253.

‡‡ *Bhagavad-Gita*, III : 4, 7.

* Mookerji, Radhakumud, *Local Government in Ancient India*, p. 8.

† Law, N. N., *Studies in Ancient Hindu Polity, based on the Arthashastra of Kautilya*, p. 89.

‡ Dutt, R. C., *History of Civilization in Ancient India*, Vol. I, p. 223.

§ Monier-Williams, Sir Monier, *Brahmanism and Hinduism*, p. 455.

¶ Mukerjee, Radhakamal, *The Foundations of Indian Economics*, p. 3.

§ Mookerji, *op. cit.*, p. 3.

** *Ibid.*, p. 153.

†† *Ibid.*, p. 160.

‡‡ *Ibid.*, p. 3.

§§ Law, *op. cit.*, p. 2-3.

¶¶ *Ibid.*, p. 93.

*** *Ibid.*, p. 94.

pond to the four main functional groups which are to be found in any civilization. They were not always iron-clad arbitrary divisions of society on a hereditary basis, but once gave actual indication of the stage of individual development. Through successive lives on earth, each was to advance from the lowest to the highest stage.

The respective duties of the four castes of Brahmanas, Kshatriyas, Vaisyas, and Sudras, are also determined by the qualities which predominate in the disposition of each . . . The natural duty of a Brahman compriseth tranquillity, purity, self-mastery, patience, rectitude, learning, spiritual discernment, and belief in the existence of another world. Those of the Kshatriya sprung from his nature, are valour, glory, strength, firmness, not to flee from the field of battle, liberality and a lordly character. The natural duties of a Vaisya are to till the land, tend cattle, and to buy and sell; and that of the Sudra is to serve, as is his natural disposition.*

Even in the period from which the ancient Hindu literature dates, however, occupation tended to depend upon the caste into which one was born. Trade, as a function of a lower caste, was frowned upon for Brahmans, although permitted in case of temporary necessity, with numerous restrictions.† The individual had ever to subordinate himself to the good of the caste and of the family, "joint in food, worship, and estate".

Trade was carefully regulated. There were laws generally applied forbidding adulteration of goods.‡ The *Laws of Manu* provided that all weights and measures must be duly marked and officially re-examined once in six months.§ The familiar medieval ideas of a just price and of governmental regulation of price are frequently encountered. It was the king's duty periodically to settle prices, taking into account transportation and storage charges, gross margin, and net profit.¶

Interest taking was considered generally reprehensible, but men of the two higher castes might "lend [money at interest] to one who neglects his sacred duties, to a miser, to an atheist, or to a very wicked man".§ A Vaisya might live by usury, but the interest was regulated by law.

Gold was employed in very ancient times as a medium of exchange, and coins were issued by the guilds at least as early as the third century, B. C. They were issued also by the free clans or autonomous communities.**

We have the prototype of modern principles of taxation in the *Laws of Manu*:—

As the Sun during eight months (imperceptibly) draws up the water with his rays, even so let him gradually draw his taxes from his kingdom; for that is

the office in which he resembles the Sun.* Import duties and sales taxes were common.†

Wage rates were fixed under Chandra Gupta, the use of pure and sound materials was enforced, and the performance of a fair day's work for fair wages was required.‡

Guilds are referred to both in the *Vedas* and in the *Laws of Manu*.§ A definite term of apprenticeship was prescribed, during which the apprentice was to be treated like a son.¶ A passage in the *Ramayana* describes the procession of citizens who went out into the forest in search of Rama, the gem-cutters, potters, weavers, armourers, ivory-workers and goldsmiths, together with many others.§

The merchant guilds did not attain the same development as the craft guilds, but there is evidence of corporate action among merchants, as in the co-operative chartering of a vessel.** Ancient seals have been found in Upper India with the inscription: "Corporation of bankers, traders, and merchants."††

A discussion of the economic concepts of the ancient Hindus would not be complete without a reference to the generally recogniz-

ed duty of sharing wealth, which is rooted in the idea of the unity of all life. It was forbidden ever to eat "without having given away (some small portion of the food)".‡‡ Benefactions were both sacred and secular, the latter including endowing schools and free ferries, digging wells, planting fruit-trees, and building rest-houses for the traveller.§§

The *Bhagavad-Gita* defines the right and wrong types of charity:—

Those gifts which are bestowed at the proper time upon the proper person, and by men who are not desirous of a return, are of the *sattva* quality, good and of the nature of truth. But that gift which is given with the expectation of a return from the beneficiary or with a view to spiritual benefit flowing therefrom or with reluctance, is of the *rajas* quality, bad and partaketh of untruth. Gifts given out of place and season and to unworthy persons, without proper attention and scornfully, are of the *tamas* quality, wholly bad and of the nature of darkness.¶¶

It would be unreasonable to expect in ancient Hindu literature anything like a discussion of economics in modern terms, but a complicated economic structure did exist in ancient India and economic concepts were not lacking. Perhaps the most definite contributions to economic theory are the philosophical propositions that

* *Bhagavad-Gita*, XVIII: 41-44.

† *Sacred Laws of the Aryas*, Vol. II, p. 72-3.

‡ *Law*, op. cit., p. 94.

§ *Laws of Manu*, p. 324.

¶ *Ibid.*

§ *Sacred Laws of the Aryas*, Vol. XIV, p. 175.

** *Mookerji*, op. cit., p. 214-15.

* *Laws of Manu*, p. 396.

† *Sacred Laws of the Aryas*, Vol. XIV, p. 200.

‡ Coomaraswamy, A. K., *The Indian Craftsman*, p. 61.

§ Mookerji, op. cit., p. 35; Coomaraswamy op. cit., p. 19.

¶ Mookerji, op. cit., p. 51.

§ Coomaraswamy, op. cit., pp. 13-14.

** Mookerji, op. cit., p. 76.

†† *Ibid.*, p. 213.

‡‡ *Sacred Laws of the Aryas*, Vol. XIV, p. 240.

§§ Mookerji, op. cit., p. 100.

¶¶ *Bhagavad-Gita*, XVII: 20-22.

value is wholly subjective, that the material universe is unreal and unsatisfying because impermanent, and that contentment is to be found, not in the fulfilment of desires, but in their elimination.

ELEANOR M. HOUGH

II

ON BENEVOLENT DESPOTS AND DESPOTIC TRUSTEES

[Franklin Edgerton, well-known Sanskritist and Professor of Comparative Philology at Yale University is the translator of *Matanga-Lila: The Elephant Lore of the Hindus*, and of *Vikrama-Charitra: Vikrama's Adventures*, as well of the *Gita* and the *Panchatantra*.—EDS.]

In the twenty-five years since its discovery, much has been written on the "Hindu Machiavelli," that is the *Kautilya Arthaśāstra*, or Kautilya's *Science of Polity* the oldest and greatest of ancient Sanskrit treatises on political science. According to tradition it is the work of the prime minister of the Emperor Chandragupta, who overthrew the Greek regime founded by Alexander the Great in India. The reliability of this tradition is doubted by many scholars. For our purposes it is unimportant; in any case the work must be nearly as old as the beginning of the Christian era, if not somewhat older.

In this article I want to call attention to only one of its doctrines: one from which I think many modern governments could profitably learn, and which has not attracted the attention it deserves.

But first, by way of orientation for those who may not know the book, let me briefly set forth its general character and viewpoint. These are very important as a

background for the particular passage we are about to consider. It is written wholly from the standpoint of the "prince who wants to be victorious" (*vijigīṣu*). His interests alone are made the goal. No other consideration is allowed in the slightest degree to interfere. And his interests are conceived in the most realistic, not to say cold-blooded fashion. The only question is, how may he get the better of everybody with whom he comes in any sort of contact? It is as if his ministers, his subjects, even the members of his own family, existed only for his gratification. It is calmly assumed that he is to use them all for his own benefit, exploit them ruthlessly, and throw them aside at any moment if they stand in his way. Still more, all foreign powers are his legitimate prey. His immediate neighbours are his natural enemies; this is taken for granted. The neighbour of his neighbour is indeed his natural ally, but only as being by definition his enemy's enemy; and his ally is to be used, quite unsentimentally, in his own selfish

interest, and so on. Without going into greater detail, it may be said that even a casual acquaintance with this work will indicate that it is absolutely free from moral scruples. If you want to study Hindu ethics, you must look elsewhere; the book of Kautilya professes to give advice solely directed to one end, the practical success of a conquering ruler. Morality may be all very well in its place, it seems to say; conceivably you may rate it higher than political advantage; in that case you need not take the advice offered here. It is the sole business of this book to expound the principles of practical statecraft, in a strictly cold and scientific fashion; and in following that aim it looks neither to the right nor to the left.

I have emphasized this general outlook of Kautilya because I want it to be particularly clear that he is the last author in the world who could be accused of that "weakness" or "sloppy sentimentality" of which our "hard-boiled" statesmen are apt to accuse those who want to apply morals to statecraft,—who talk of the "rights" of conquered peoples, for instance. Kautilya recognizes no "rights" at all, only interests; and he never allows another interest to interfere with that of his "would-be conqueror".

If, then, he ever does give advice which happens to sound moral, we may be sure that this is a mere coincidence. It only means that in this particular case he thinks that a moral course is

likely to be politically profitable.

Now, then, let me quote the following extract from Kautilya's chapter on the treatment of a conquered land. It occurs in the fifth chapter of the thirteenth book, or the 176th chapter from the beginning:—

When he has acquired (by conquest) a new territory, let him overshadow the faults of his enemy (the former possessor) with his own good qualities, and the (enemy's) good qualities with yet more surpassing good qualities (of his own).

By performance of his own duties, and by acts of grace, remittance of taxes, largess, and distribution of honours, let him aim at the satisfaction and welfare of the subjects.

Let him reward according to his (previous) promises those (of the former enemy) who adhered to his cause; and yet more those who (specially) exerted themselves (for him). For one who does not keep his word cannot be trusted by his own party or by strangers. [N. B. And he will therefore not be successful. Not because it is right, but because it is profitable, one must keep his word.]

No more (can) one whose manner of life is uncongenial to the subjects (be trusted by them). Therefore he shall adopt the same character, style of dress, language, and customs. And he shall show attachment to the local deities, gatherings, festivals, and amusements of the country.

Among the leading men of the villages, castes, and associations of the country, his spies shall be constantly employed in calling attention to the misdeeds of the late foe (the former ruler), and to their lord's nobility and loving-kindness to them (these leading men), and the honours which he has paid to them. And he shall make use of them (the "leading men") by studied application of suitable gratifications, remissions of taxes, and protection. He shall see that proper respect is paid to all the

deities and to (men in all the four traditional) stages of life, and that gifts of land and money and remissions of taxes are bestowed upon men who are distinguished for learning, eloquence, or piety. He shall cause all prisoners to be released, and provide charity for the poor, helpless, and distressed. At [certain festival periods] he shall ordain, temporary abstention from taking the life of any living creature. . .

This passage shows some striking contrasts with traditional western methods of dealing with conquered territories. With us the conqueror usually has one of two aims. Either he seeks to annihilate as far as possible the cultural autonomy of the conquered land, to make it indistinguishable from the realm to which it is annexed, by suppressing differences of language, custom, and national feeling. This is usually the method employed when the conquered land adjoins that of the conquerors, as was presumably always the case in Kautilya's range of experience. Or, in the case of distant lands and those whose inhabitants differ very markedly in race and culture from the conquerors, so that assimilation is obviously impossible, there is a tendency, not always fully conscious but easily perceptible as a rule, to accentuate such differences, with implication of the fundamental superiority of the conquerors over the conquered. Members of the conquering people who reside in the conquered land keep themselves more or less aloof and superior. The "native" culture is treated with an indifference often tinged with contempt.

Kautilya, on the other hand, says that the conqueror should actually adopt the dress, language, and customs of the conquered—of course when living in their land; this is obviously implied, though not distinctly stated. He should seem to identify himself with them, patronize their religion, and encourage their local spirit in all its innocent forms. So far from trying to break down the provincial culture, he should encourage and develop it. He should make himself popular by acts of charity and largess, should lighten taxes, make the administration of justice lenient, and show an interest in local festivals and amusements. The Kautilya policy may be summed up by saying that the conqueror should exert himself to the utmost to make the conquered people glad of the change in government. His rule should contrast so favourably with the displaced regime that no one will wish for its return, unless a few who got personal profit from it.

And remember that all this is not due to any tenderness of sentiment. Kautilya does not care a snap of his finger what happens to the conquered people or their culture. If he thought it advantageous to the conqueror, he would quite cheerfully have them all blotted out of existence. No: it is simply that in his opinion it is to the advantage of the conqueror that the people of the annexed territory should be happy and contented. If they were not, he fears that they would be

a constant menace and a source of weakness rather than strength. And he thinks that they are not likely to be made happy by a policy of the iron hand, by suppression of their language and local culture, by humiliation and degradation.

This policy is not wholly without parallel in the West; and when it has been tried, it has seemed to be brilliantly successful. Something very similar to it was tried by Great Britain in dealing with the Boer republics conquered in the South African war. Result: when Britain became involved in war with Germany, the great majority of the Boers enthusiastically supported her and gave her very material aid against that same Germany whose sympathies had notoriously been on the side of the Boers in their war with Britain. Does not this suggest that Kautilya's idea has something to be said for it?

But usually, as we all know, the policy adopted is very different. It is not necessary to cite specific instances; many will occur to all who know modern history. The countless European wars of the last few centuries have furnished many examples of annexed provinces. After the annexation, the conquering government generally does its level best to suppress the local culture and

the very language of the new province. This has been carried even to such a point that the people have been forbidden to speak in their own native language! How different is the policy of Kautilya, who tells the conqueror to learn the language of the conquered!

I venture therefore to suggest that modern governments might profitably ponder the advice given by this shrewd and unsentimental old Indian statesman; and that not on moral grounds at all, but purely on grounds of practical wisdom. It is at least worth considering whether it would not be advantageous to the conqueror that the people of the conquered land should be led to think of him as a friend and fellow-countryman, and to regard his government as a patron and supporter of their traditional culture, rather than as its implacable foe, or its barely tolerant and condescendingly superior foreign overlord. Perhaps it might prove that Kautilya was right in thinking that real profit for the "prince who wants to be victorious" lies in furthering the economic and cultural welfare of the conquered people, even if it seems to involve financial loss to himself; the money so sacrificed might be returned with interest.

FRANKLIN EDGERTON

III

THE CO-OPERATIVE COMMONWEALTH

[Manu Subedar, B.A., B.Sc. Econ. (London), Barrister-at-Law, is the author of *Gita Explained by Dnaneshwara Maharaj*. "Dnaneshwari" has been called by H. P. Blavatsky, the "king of mystic works," and we hope to publish a review of it in an early number; meantime, here is something for practical politicians to think about.—EDS.]

The most confirmed materialist must acknowledge that, beyond the limits of his perception, there is a vast region of knowledge relating to the fundamentals of human life and to the origin and end of different phenomena. Spiritual learning comprises these laws affecting the human consciousness and its relation to the universe outside. The fact that this knowledge is rare and is not shared by the multitude accounts for much confusion and for the existence of quacks and charlatans since the days of antiquity. Under these circumstances, out of millions of individuals only a few seek this knowledge, and the hesitation with which they must necessarily approach every source of spiritual guidance can be understood and condoned. Many have sought to show the strait path under all climes and at all times. There have been many high-souled individuals who have shown compassion to common mortals and who have indicated the method of achieving joy and happiness within oneself.

A very high place amongst such teachers of mankind has to be given to Dnaneshwara Maharaj, who lived six hundred years ago. He has left to the world a masterpiece the *Dnaneshwari*. The

Gita, on which the *Dnaneshwari* is the most outstanding commentary, provides spiritual guidance for men at every stage of life. Indeed, in certain portions it goes into technicalities of Yoga, which it is not possible for the ordinary reader even to understand. The *Dnaneshwari* has been rightly mentioned amongst the works on mysticism containing knowledge which only adepts can use with safety and success, yet it has plain and simple guidance for plain and simple men. With neither of these aspects is it my intention to deal in this article. It is the correlation of social and ethical life with spiritual well-being and progress, in the teaching of Dnaneshwara Maharaj, about which I wish to write. Attention should be directed towards the relationship which should exist between man and man in order to secure maximum welfare. It is the responsibility of an individual towards his higher self which creates man's obligations towards the rest of humanity. In the language of the highest realisation, it is "All in One" and "One in All". In relation to social science and the responsibilities of common citizenship, it means that every individual has responsibility for every evil which exists around

him. Because he does not perceive any direct connection between himself and any particular institution, system, or practice, which is harmful to other human beings, or which debases them or deprives them of their due, he cannot plead that he has nothing to do with it. A parallel thought worked up, not from the spiritual, but from the scientific point of view, occurs in many places in the writings of western thinkers.

Emphasis on this aspect has become important not only on account of the current events in the world, but because it is one of the most elusive factors for the individual seeker who aims at removing baseness from this life and at preparing for spiritual advancement. There is a dim realisation of this great truth in the statement that human nature is essentially good and, if left to itself, will seek harmony. What has not been completely exposed is the lengths of cruelty, dishonesty and mental reservation, to which man in his representative capacity can go. The standard case is that of a soldier, who in his private life would not hurt any one; but in uniform and when charging the enemy he knows no other object except that of killing men. Men dealing in foreign trade, in enterprises like banking and shipping, in finance, in diplomatic and intelligence services, are no less unscrupulous and indulge almost habitually in acts conceived by them to be to the advantage of their own country, nation or group, but

equally palpably to the serious disadvantage of other masses of human beings. Insidious propaganda inspired by purely political reasons is zealously aided and abetted by persons of both sexes, whose life in their own limited circle is without a blemish. Two wrongs do not make a right, but even a wrong inflicted incidentally prevents anything being set right, however much on the surface it may appear to be advantageous to one set of people. As a reaction of its impact, it creates forces that weaken the moral foundations even of those who seem temporarily to gain something; but, above all, it impedes the spiritual progress of the individual.

The central plank in the teaching of Dnaneshwara Maharaj is an emphasis on obligations; and in human affairs, according to him, it is more important that what is due between man and man should be always kept in mind than the discussion of individual rights. All individual rights arise only after human rights are assured to the rest of humanity. Otherwise it is a phenomenon of exploitation. Privileged positions impose even greater obligations. So long as preference is shown in any society from any cause whatsoever, individual ambition and achievements will always be, but Dnaneshwara Maharaj would have us measure these in the form of service. The human race is conceived of as a human family, in which food is given to all according to their needs after the necessary obliga-

would not be welcomed by those who think that they have more to give than they will receive. Yet, until it is definitely established that one human being stands in the same position in all respects as another human being with regard to all material needs of the world, the defective organization of human society divided into armed camps, and as its reaction, the exploitation even of large masses of human beings inside the nation, must continue. A difference of status amongst men may be necessary even after the basic understanding is reached; and difference in personality and in spiritual growth must survive; but, instead of pointing away from reality as the present order of things now does, the new arrangement would, while making human beings better and bigger in all respects, accomplish more quickly even the material progress, on which everything at present is staked. If the great mass of inventiveness and effort which is directed towards the means of destruction or of defence, were diverted into the search for increased production in agriculture and manufactures, it is impossible to conceive that the world as a whole would be worse off than it is to-day. What would disappear is a sense of

possession in individuals, and what would diminish is the insolent superiority which every nation claims over other nations, and the genuine dominance, which some countries enjoy over other countries.

Applying the teaching of Dnaneshwara Maharaj to modern conditions, it would be necessary for the individual to adjust his relationship not only with his immediate surroundings, his family, his community, tribe, or country, but also with the rest of the world. It would also be necessary for him not only to give up exploiting and dominating others, but also to avoid such evils in a representative capacity of whatever nature.

Those who search for joy eternal and for uninterrupted harmony, must lay the foundations thereof. While it is not given to every one to achieve this completely, even a temporary uplift from the normal worldly motives will bring peace to the mind and happiness to the self of an unprecedented character.

The *Dnaneshwari* provides for thoughtful individuals an inexhaustible mine of truths capable of being practised under all conditions by every one, whatever the stage of their spiritual growth may be.

MANU SUBEDAR

DETERMINISM AND FREEWILL IN SUFISM

[Dr. Margaret Smith wrote on "The Doctrine of Reincarnation in Islamic Literature" in our January issue, and now she turns to the twin doctrine of Karma. Every true Sufi is a Theosophist and understands that Fate and Freewill are but two aspects of one and the same Law.—EDS.]

The teaching of orthodox Islam on Predestination and Freewill lays its chief emphasis on the former. "Nothing can befall us, but what God hath destined for us" (Sura ix. 51), "God's behest is a fixed decree" (xxxiii. 38), "Verily God misleadeth whom He will and guideth whom He will" (xxxv. 9), and other similar verses of the Qur'an indicate man's helplessness in the face of the Divine decree, though certain others suggest his responsibility for his own acts, e.g. "For its own works lieth every soul in pledge" (lxxiv. 41) and "Whoso does good benefits himself, and whoso does evil, does it against himself." (xli. 46)

It was against the orthodox doctrine of Predestination, by which it appeared that God was the Author of evil and that man was punished for actions not within his own control, that the Mu'tazilites rose up in the eighth century, calling themselves Ahl al-'Adl i.e. supporters of the Divine Justice, to proclaim the doctrine of man's freewill; and it is significant that tradition has asserted that their founder was a disciple of Hasan of Basra (ob., A. D. 728), who is reckoned as one of the earliest of the Sufis. Other individuals had already asserted the doctrine of Freewill

and been put to death for their teaching, and the Mu'tazilites were also regarded as heretics by the orthodox, who accused them of dualism, because they explained the existence of evil by setting up a second principle, the will of man, against the Will of God.

The Sufis could not accept any doctrine savouring of dualism, while at the same time they would not repudiate man's moral responsibility for his actions. And therefore we find that they accept both doctrines, teaching the Unity of God and the over-ruling power of the Divine Will, as their thesis, accepting man's freedom of action and the obligation upon him to choose good rather than evil and to strive towards his own perfection, as the antithesis, and providing their own synthesis by which these two apparently contradictory doctrines were completely harmonised and shewn to be really only two sides of one and the same Law.

The earliest Sufi conception of Ultimate Reality emphasised the Divine Will and regarded the universe as being the result of the activity of that Will. The Persian al-Hujwiri (ob., A. D. 1079), one of the early writers on Sufi doctrine, gives us his conception of God as the First Cause, stating that all that exists is

dependent on His Will; what He wills, that He does, and what He wills is what He has known aforetime. His decrees are absolute and it is for His servants to submit themselves thereto in complete resignation to His Will. To Him belongs the power of predestination, both good and evil, and He is therefore the Only Agent and Sole Cause of all existence. Yet Hujwiri himself states that the believer in the Unity, *i.e.*, the Sūfī, ought, while holding the doctrine of determinism (*jabr*), to act as though he believed in freewill (*qadar*), taking a middle course between the two. The Sūfīs use their power of freewill to signify their preference of God's choice to their own, and so are content with the good and evil which God has chosen for them.

Sahl Tustarī, an early Sūfī, who died in A. D. 896, says of God that in His origin—

He was and there was nothing else and He dwelt in solitude apart. He knew and He willed and He ordained and predestined and directed. Actions are attributed to His servants, but the beginning is from Him and the end rests with Him. All things exist in the knowledge of God and by His decree.

But while laying stress on the fact that no man can escape his destiny, Tustarī gives man control over his own actions.

To al-Hallāj, the great mystic who was put to death for his teaching in A. D. 922, determinism is really foreknowledge. God foresees both good and evil, but He commands only good and therefore man can never urge

predestination as a reason for wrong-doing or giving way to the pressure of circumstances. But man's will needs to be strengthened by God's grace. Abū Sa'id b. Abi'l-Khayr (*ob.*, A. D. 1049), the writer of some of the most beautiful mystic quatrains to be found in Persian literature, stated in his teaching that man was freed from desire only when God freed him. And this was effected not by man's own efforts, but by the grace of God and His help, since God gave him the desire for freedom and led him to repentance, until he realised that all good acts were done by the grace of God and through His assistance, and that to attribute them to his own endeavours was polytheism, for it meant that another power was at work in the world beside the Divine Will. Even when the Sūfī is actuated simply by love of God in all he does, he finds no peace until he realises that it is God who loves him and enables him to love, and this is the result of the Divine love and grace, not of his own efforts. To Abū Sa'id, this view of Divine Determinism seems essential to the acknowledgment, by the mystic, of the Unity of all existence: only so can he come to realise that all action depends upon God Almighty, and to know that "all is He and all is by Him and all is His," and that there is no place for "I" or "mine". Then the mystic wills—and here we see that after all Abū Sa'id finds a place for freewill and human choice—what God wills;

his own will has vanished and he is free from desire, and has gained peace and joy in this world and the world to come.*

The question is argued very fully by Jalāl al-Dīn Rūmī (*ob.*, A. D. 1273) in the *Masnavi*, where he insists that our actions, though due ultimately to Divine agency, are yet the result of our own freewill, and therefore we cannot hold God responsible for them. Evil may be decreed by God in order that good may be thereby manifested and realised, but while the good man should accept such apparent evil as coming from God, he will not accept evil that is the result of his own sinful passions. We are fully aware both of the over-ruling power of God and of our own freedom to do good or to do ill. Our humility, he says, is evidence of the former, and our sense of guilt, of the latter. Acceptance of predestination is no excuse for our evil deeds, for in every act which we *desire* to do, we are clearly conscious of our power to do it; but when we are faced with an action for which we have no inclination, we become determinists and cast responsibility for the omission upon God.† Rūmī distinguishes between the Ultimate Cause (Destiny) and the immediate cause, which is under our own control, but goes back to that Ultimate Cause.

This immediate cause was produced by that Cause; when did any cause proceed from itself without a cause?

The ultimate Cause makes the immediate cause operative; sometimes, again, it makes it fruitless, and ineffective.‡

Rūmī, then, states plainly that all that happens is predestined, even though our actions seem to be our own and we are morally responsible for them. It is the creative act of God, he says, that brings our action into existence: our actions, therefore, are the effects of that Divine Creative act. Freewill, he says elsewhere, is the endeavour to offer thanks for God's benefits, *i. e.*, when exerted to choose the good and follow His path; determinism, on the other hand, is denial of those benefits, if we do evil and attribute it to Him and not to ourselves. For Destiny leads us always upwards and onwards, the Divine Will is for good and not for evil.

If the Divine Destiny shrouds thee in black like the night, yet the Divine Destiny will take thy hand at the last. If the Divine Destiny a hundred times seems to threaten thy life, yet it is the Divine Destiny that gives thee life and a means of salvation.§

There is no real contradiction between determinism and freedom for the true Sūfī, the mystic who loves God with such a perfect love that his will becomes one with the Divine Will, that one of whom Abū Yazīd had said that to him no choice was left, because to him God's choice had become the only choice. It is Love that solves the problem of the clash between determinism and freewill, for the true lover has no will

* *Asrār al-Tawhīd*, pp. 376-378.

† Book I. 636.

‡ Book I. 843, 845.

§ *Ibid.*, 1258, 1259.

of his own, that he should desire anything, whether good or ill; he who loves God, desires only what He desires, and he whom God loves desires naught but God Himself. "Love," said Shibli, "is a fire in the heart, consuming all save the Will of the Beloved," and Jāmī also says: "The Sūfī has no individual will: his will is obliterated in the Will of God, nay, indeed, his will is the very Will of God." So Rūmī writes:—

The word "compulsion" made me impatient for Love's sake: this is the shining forth of the moon, this is no cloud. They know the true meaning of "compulsion," whose eyes God hath opened. To them the unseen things of the future have been revealed, to them remembrance of the past has become naught.*

For such Sūfī writers as these the problem was solved, and the antithesis disappeared in unity of feeling, but certain of the Sūfīs discuss the problem on more philosophical lines. Ibn al-'Arabī (*ob.*, A. D. 1240) teaches that men have really no freewill, because all is determined by the Divine Will, since God is the only Real Existence; yet at the same time he asserts men's individual responsibility for their acts, which are logically self-determined, the determining self being simply an "individualisation" of the Divine Being. "Whatsoever Destiny decrees concerning a thing," he says, "is decreed by means of the thing itself. This is the hidden mystery of Determination." It was a celebrated Sūfī writer of the school of Ibn 'Arabī who was

so concerned with this question that he devoted a whole treatise to it. This was 'Abd al-Razzāq al-Kāshānī (*ob.*, A. D. 1329), well known for his commentaries on Ibn al-'Arabī's writings, and also on those of the mystic poet Ibn al-Fārīd of Cairo. 'Abd al-Razzāq wrote an "Epistle on Determination and Freewill," in which he discusses the subject very fully. Predestination, he holds, represents the existence of the universal types of all things in the world of Universal Reason, *i. e.*, the Ultimate Cause, whereas self-determination is due to the individualisation of those types in the world of Universal Soul, in order to be adapted to matter; and these individualisations are attached to their immediate causes, by which they are produced, and appear at their appointed times. Freewill is itself pre-determined. It is in this world of the Soul that every thing is set in motion, a movement due to the irresistible yearning of souls for their spiritual Source, Universal Reason, to which they seek to assimilate themselves and so to become universalised. As they progress on their upward way, with each step of the ascent they receive fresh inspiration from that Source, which draws them ever nearer to Itself. With each step, also, they exert an influence on matter, according to its power of receptivity, and so there results a series of changes in this world, which correspond to those taking place in the souls themselves.

These changes may be so great as to involve creation or destruction, or of a lesser degree involving variations in condition only.

'Abd al-Razzāq therefore postulates the existence of a remote First Cause (Destiny) and also of an infinite number of interdependent, secondary, immediate causes. When man has made his choice, by the exercise of his freewill, the act, possible before, is produced inevitably, so that all action is at the same time both destined and free. It is foreknown to God and decreed that every act shall be produced by the united operation of certain causes, but it is also decreed that the agent shall exercise his freewill in the production of the act. Some, says 'Abd al-Razzāq, regard only the First Cause and become fatalists, others regard only the secondary causes and so attribute the absolute power of creation and decision to the human will. 'Abd al-Razzāq holds that a balance must be preserved between these views. The fatalists, he asserts, are as "one-eyed" as those who uphold only the existence of freewill. These latter are deprived of the right eye, the stronger, that which makes us contemplate the Divine Essence, the First Cause; and the former, the fatalists, are deprived of the left eye, the feebler, that which enables us to see outward things, the immediate causes. That one who sees properly, and who makes use of the two eyes of the heart, contemplates the Divine Essence with the right eye, and attributes

both good and evil actions to the Divine Will; and at the same time regards the creatures with the left eye and admits the actual influence which they exert upon actions, but as a result of the Eternal Will of God, not independently of Him.

'Abd al-Razzāq emphasises the innumerable and intermingling causes at work in the world, and the processes which are in course of continuous development, in order to shew that in life, as in the exercise of purpose and will, there must be multiplicity. Matter varies in its nature, some being of a grosser type, and some finer and more subtle; it receives a soul corresponding to its type, and therefore souls also vary. Character and disposition result from the combination of the material and the spiritual, and it is for the soul to overcome the hindrances of the material body and itself to rise towards its spiritual Source. In the life to come, all souls will receive such retribution as they deserve. Some souls, who have made the fullest possible use of their capacities and their opportunities, will enter at once into the joy of the Blessed, while others, who fell short of the degree of perfection to which they might have attained, and who wilfully misused their opportunities, working evil instead of good, must undergo a process of purification, and endure punishment in proportion to their sins, but it will not be for ever.

'Abd al-Razzāq, like other Sūfī writers before him, asserts that

* *Masnavi* Bk. I, 1463, 1466.

for the true mystic there is no conflict between determinism and freewill, no problem as to ultimate and secondary causes, for in the contemplation of the Divine Unity the Sūfī attributes all actions directly to God. Ignoring all ideas of relation, and suppressing causes and effects, he "folds up" creation as a carpet, bridges the gulf by a single leap, frees himself from the categories of "between" and "where," and becomes absorbed in the Divine Essence, dead unto himself and blind unto the created world, for he is submerged in the All, prevented from seeing the creatures, by his contemplation of the Creative Truth. Multiplicity, for him, has vanished, he has ceased to be aware of his own existence as distinct from the One, and this is the supreme joy, the final attainment, for he has reached the goal of the quest. Now, as Hujwiri tells us, God has fulfilled in him that which He willed for him, that his last state should become once more his first state, and that he should now be as he was before he came into existence, when the spirit, not yet joined to an earthly body, dwelt in the Light and Presence of God.*

Then, 'Abdal-Razzāq teaches, when, after experiencing union with the Divine, the mystic returns to the world, the Vision of the Creative Truth does not distract him from regarding the creatures, still less can the creatures distract him from the Creator. This is the true gnostic, who has arrived at certainty; he is no longer perplexed, for he well knows the relation of actions to God, since He has predestined them, but at the same time he does not deprive them of their relation to men.

The Sūfīs, therefore, have found the synthesis, and in their view no contradiction remains. Since all Reality and the only Reality is the One Divine Essence, then all that comes to pass is the result of the Divine Predestination, but since the soul itself partakes of that Divine Essence, it also partakes of the power to determine its own destiny—"Whatsoever the soul soweth," says Rūmī, "is from the Soul of the soul,"—and when it has realised its oneness with the One, then there is no more talk of "mine" and "Thine" for the individual will knows itself to be in very truth one with the Eternal Will of God.

MARGARET SMITH

* For a full account of the life and teaching of 'Abd al-Razzāq, cf. *Journal Asiatique* 1873, pp. 125 ff. My quotations from the *Masnawī* are taken from the Persian Text ed. R. A. Nicholson (Gibb Series).

MODERN SCIENCE AND THE SECRET DOCTRINE

IV.—PSYCHOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS

[Dr. Ivor B. Hart, O.B.E. was until recently an Honorary Research Assistant in the Department of History of Medicine, University College, and an Extension Lecturer at the University of London. He is the author of *Makers of Science, The Mechanical Investigations of Leonardo da Vinci, The Great Engineers, The Great Physicists* and numerous text-books on Physics.—EDS.]

In the series of articles under the above general title, we have considered in succession some of the more important and basic of the physical concepts of Western Science, and we have compared the trend of thought on these subjects as inspired by modern research with the general attitude of the theosophical writings of Madame Blavatsky in *The Secret Doctrine* of fifty years ago.

We have also shown a close correspondence between the two that cannot fail to be striking and significant. So far, however, we have confined ourselves to the realms of formal physics and mechanics. Here the cold materialism of the orthodox scientific mind was able to have full scope, although, as we saw in our last article, this attitude began to show definite signs of failure in dealing with the phenomenon—"time"—that willy nilly could not be divorced from the consideration of the human personality.

When, however, we leave the field of pure physics and consider the branch of Western Science known as psychology, we pass almost completely from the world of materialism to the world of personality—from the behaviour

of inert matter to the laws of life. We have used the phrase "almost completely" very deliberately. Old habits, like old shibboleths, die hard. The ingrained and deeply rooted attitude of impersonal materialism towards scientific research has reached and has almost completely absorbed the Western psychologist of to-day. He is as definitely "out" to measure reflexes and impressions and the like as the pure physicist is to measure deflections and angles. A whole technique of experimental psychology has come into being; and following further the stereotyped lines of advancement, nowadays we have a very healthy and vigorous "applied science" known as "industrial psychology". Let there be no misapprehension about this. We have not only no quarrel with these developments, but we hasten to acknowledge freely and fully the reality and the growth of what is in fact one of the youngest of modern sciences in the Western world (although actually one of the oldest of Eastern studies), and to say that the application of the lessons of experimental psychology to modern industry has made for the undoubted better-

ment of factory and industrial life.

Yet the fact remains that we have here a science that concerns itself not with matter, but with mind, with the human personality, and the human consciousness; not with externals but with the "fundamental internals," that is, Life itself. Treat these as much as you like on a material basis, and you can do no more than learn about the husk. It is as impossible and as hopeless as would be an attempt to learn of the rich stores of treasure within a building by studying its walls and exterior. The door is open. Will you not enter?

There is one aspect for consideration in connection with the idea of "time" which was purposely not stressed in the previous article of this series, and to which we must now refer. It is that "time" is not merely a fundamental of physical science, but also that it is a *happening*—an *experience*—an attribute, in fact, of human consciousness. We laid stress upon the fact that time, unlike space, could only be measured one way, "forwards," or "onwards". Yet there is certainly a "backwards" also, belonging not to the future, but to the past. Here time passes beyond the ken of the physicist, and becomes material for enquiry by the psychologist; only now it is referred to as memory. We re-quote from *The Secret Doctrine* :—

Nothing on earth has real duration, for nothing remains without change—or the same—for the billionth part of a

second; and the sensation we have of the actuality of the division of "time" known as the present, comes from the blurring of that momentary glimpse, or succession of glimpses, of things that our senses give us, as those things pass from the region of ideals which we call the future, to the region of memories that we name the past. (I. 37.)

This is putting it as simply as possible in language that might just as easily have been employed by the exoteric materialist instead of, as was the case, by the esoteric occultist. It agrees in its formal aspects entirely with the viewpoint of the orthodox psychologist who tells us of the memory continuum arising from the contiguous association of a large number of successive impressions in a very short space of time. But let us follow H. P. Blavatsky further.

The three periods—the Present, the Past, and the Future—are in the esoteric philosophy a compound time; for the three are a composite number only in relation to the phenomenal plane, but in the realm of noumena have no abstract validity. As said in the Scriptures: "The Past time is the Present time, as also the Future, which, though it has not come into existence, still is"; . . . Our ideas, in short, on duration and time are all derived from our sensations according to the laws of Association. Inextricably bound up with the relativity of human knowledge, they nevertheless can have no existence except in the experience of the individual ego, and perish when its evolutionary march dispels the Maya of phenomenal existence. (I. 43-44)

Eastern philosophy regards every finite thing as the illusion of ignorance—and those who have read an earlier article by the present writer on "The Doctrine of Māyā in Relation to Modern Science" (THE ARYAN PATH, April

1930) will at once appreciate the Māyā of memory and time. But beyond and behind the illusion of ignorance is the light of understanding. That is the goal; "There is no Religion higher than Truth" is the watchword to be found on the title page of *The Secret Doctrine*. Here East and West are on common ground. The writer is endeavouring to show in this series of articles that indeed there is much more of common ground than a mere watchword and phrase. Repeated attention has been drawn to the obscure and mystical phraseology of Mme. Blavatsky's writings in so far as it impresses the Western reader and student. It

is in many respects a great pity that there should, even in a work written in English, still remain this language difficulty, but so long as the outward formality of expression of the West persists, the inward mysticism of the Eastern occultist must continue to present difficulties of interpretation. There we must leave it, at least hopeful that the succession of articles of which this is the fourth is successfully demonstrating a vast stretch of common ground between Western science and Eastern philosophy that augurs well for the attainment of the common goal of that highest religion which is Truth.

IVOR B. HART

The *matter* of the Eastern philosophers is not the "matter" and Nature of the Western metaphysicians. For what is Matter? And above all, what is our scientific philosophy but that which was so justly and so politely defined by Kant as "the Science of the *limits* to our Knowledge?" Where have the many attempts made by Science to bind, to connect, and define all the phenomena of organic life by mere physical and chemical manifestations, brought it to? To speculation generally—mere soap-bubbles, that burst one after the other before the men of Science were permitted to discover real facts. All this would have been avoided, and the progress of knowledge would have proceeded with gigantic strides, had only Science and its philosophy abstained from accepting hypotheses on the mere one-sided Knowledge of *their* Matter. If no physical intellect is capable of counting the grains of sand covering a few miles of sea-shore; or to fathom the ultimate nature and essence of those grains, palpable and visible on the palm of the naturalist, how can any materialist limit the laws changing the conditions and being of the atoms in primordial chaos, or know anything certain about the capabilities and potency of their atoms and molecules before and after their formation into worlds? These changeless and eternal molecules—far thicker in space than the grains on the ocean shore—may differ in their constitution along the line of their planes of existence, as the soul-substance differs from its vehicle, the body. Each atom has seven planes of being or existence, we are taught; and each plane is governed by its specific laws of evolution and absorption.

—H. P. BLAVATSKY, *The Secret Doctrine*, Vol. I, p. 149-150

A DREAM EXPERIENCE

[William Saunders is the author of *Ancient Handwritings*, Editor of *The Scottish Musical Magazine*, and Honorary Secretary of Leith Nautical College. The subject of dreams is full of puzzles for the student of western psychology, the youngest of the western sciences ; but all the phenomena connected with the dream-states of human consciousness are fully explained and scientifically tabulated in *Asiatic Psychology*. A very practical classification is given by H. P. Blavatsky in *The Transactions of The Blavatsky Lodge*, p. 79. —Eds.]

Under the date of 11th June, 1826, the following entry appears in the *Journal of Sir Walter Scott*, (2nd. Edition, 1910, page 209) :—

Bad dreams about poor Charlotte. Woke, thinking my old and inseparable friend beside me ; and it was only when I was fully awake that I could persuade myself that she was dark, low and distant, and that my bed was widowed. I believe the phenomena of dreaming are in a great measure occasioned by the *double touch*, which take place when one hand is crossed in sleep upon another. Each gives and receives the impression of touch to and from the other, and this complicated sensation our sleeping fancy ascribes to the agency of another being, when it is in fact produced by our own limbs acting on each other.

Shortly after reading the above entry for the first time, I retired to rest, and, although I seldom dream,—and when I do so, it is only after some severe or prolonged mental strain,—I placed my hands in the position described by Scott, but with only a very vague and indeterminate idea of attempting an experiment, the more especially as I am well aware of the influence of touch, taste, smell or hearing upon what one may describe as the dream centres. After wriggling myself into a comfortable attitude how-

ever, I found the position of my hands not at all convenient, so I abandoned it, and instead placed them flat upon my naked stomach, and in that condition promptly went to sleep.

I must here emphasise the fact that I was then in perfect health both of mind and body. I had been doing no more work or study than I habitually accomplish under the most normal conditions, and there was nothing on my mind of a character to cause any worry or psychical disturbance whatever. Further, for weeks—probably months—before that evening, my nights had been perfectly tranquil and absolutely dreamless. And, apart from a mere passing whim, I had gone to sleep with no thought whatever of staging an experiment, and with no intention of making any effort to keep myself in the intermediate state between waking and sleeping that is so conducive to the phenomenon of dreaming. Yet, at some hour in the morning,—probably three or four o'clock—I wakened out of a nightmare with a loud cry which aroused at least one other inmate of the house. I had dreamed that I had been awakened by a loud rat-

tat-tat on the knocker of the scullery door which gives exit to our garden. I groped through the back premises in semi-darkness and, opening the scullery door, was immediately pounced upon by one of two ruffians who gripped me round the stomach with enormous hands which held me as if I had been caught in a vice. I struggled and involuntarily emitted the cry which awakened me.

I can say freely and without any affectation or egoism that, during my waking hours, I should have no such nervousness in facing even two armed burglars as would force a cry of fear from me ; and so far as its giving a reflex of my character in that respect is concerned, the dream was absolutely false. The French philosopher, M. Henri Bergson* remarks that "it is memories and only memories which weave the web of our dreams." If this should really be a fact, then my cry must have originated in some inherited primitive racial memory of danger emanating from contact between some extraneous fleshly organ and my own naked body. We have an analogous instance in the inherent horror which very young infants evince when some part of their naked bodies is brought into contact with fur of any description. This phenomenon is well known to ex-

perimental psychologists and it is undoubtedly one of the clearest manifestations of inherited memory that the records of science contain.†

In the experience cited, the all but immediate response to the touch stimulus is curious. I have long been in the habit of going to sleep with my hands resting flatly upon some part of my anatomy—generally, but not invariably, my chest—but I have never before had a dream which I could directly attribute to that. In the case in point, therefore, the main point of interest lies in the question as to whether the dream had its origin in the direct touch stimulus, or in a sub-conscious functioning of the mental processes directly induced by the impression made upon my brain on reading the extract from Sir Walter Scott's *Journal*. It was, no doubt, a combination of both that so actively stimulated the inherent, as well as the recently stored, memory cells, as to dislodge their respective contents which, as Bergson has so admirably shown, likewise combined to give the dream its essential and peculiar degrees of colour and direction.

No one, I think, will be disposed, at this time of day, seriously to dispute Bergson's contention that Dreams are the mental reconstructions of uncontrolled memories revived by means of powerful stimuli reacting upon the cerebral

* *Dreams* by Henri Bergson. English Translation by Edwin E. Slosson. London, 1914. Page 30.

† William James in his *Psychology* (Briefer Course) London, 1905, page 410, states, "Two of my children were afraid, when babies, of fur; Richet reports a similar observation." I have records of other detailed reports besides these but unfortunately cannot lay my hands on them at the moment of writing.

centres.* But that carries the investigator only half way towards the complete understanding of what the entire dream processes actually consist, and as to how they function in their entirety. The dream faculties, if one may be allowed the use of such a term, do not respond to more than a very insignificant number of the potential stimuli. During the entire period of somnolence such stimuli are indeed constantly present in the case of every sleeper. Yet, the proportion of dreams to the

number of stimuli must, even in cases of the most inveterate dreamers, be very small indeed. What then are the conditions necessary to effect such contact between the essential stimulus and the memory centres as will produce the perceptive phenomenon that we call Dream. That is the problem which now clamours for solution. When that knowledge has been attained, we shall know to the most infinitesimal degree of what Dreams actually consist.

WILLIAM SAUNDERS

* "In sleep, properly speaking, in sleep which absorbs our whole personality, it is memories and only memories, which weave the web of our dreams. But often we do not recognize them. They may be very old memories, forgotten during waking hours, drawn from the most obscure depths of our past; they may be, often are, memories of objects that we have perceived distractedly, almost unconsciously while awake. Or they may be fragments of broken memories which have been picked up here and there and mingled by chance, composing an incoherent and unrecognizable whole."—*Dreams*, p. 34.

"Our memories, at any given moment, form a solid whole, a pyramid, so to speak, whose point is inserted precisely into our present action. But behind the memories which are concerned in our occupations and are revealed by means of it, there are others, thousands of others, stored below the scene illuminated by consciousness. Yes, I believe indeed that all our past life is there, preserved even to the most infinitesimal details, and that we forget nothing, and that all that we have felt, perceived, thought, willed, from the first awakening of our consciousness, survives indestructively. But the memories which are preserved in these obscure depths are there in the state of invisible phantoms. They aspire, perhaps, to the light, but they do not even try to rise to it; they know that it is impossible, and that I, as a living and acting being, have something else to do than to occupy myself with them. But suppose that, at a given moment, I become *disinterested* in the present situation, in the present action—in short, in all which previously has fixed and guided my memory; suppose, in other words, that I am asleep. Then these memories, perceiving that I have taken away the obstacle, have raised the trap-door which has kept them beneath the floor of consciousness, arise from the depths; they rise, they move, they perform in the night of unconsciousness a great dance macabre. They rush together to the door that has been left ajar. They all want to get through. But they cannot; there are too many of them. From the multitudes which are called, which will be chosen? It is not hard to say. Formerly when I was awake, the memories which forced their way were those which could involve claims of relationship with the present situation, with what I saw and heard around me."—*Dreams*, pp 36-38

I should be prepared to go still further than Bergson does, and say that besides all our past life, much, if not all, of our ancestral history lies stored in the form of somnolent memory, below the scene of our consciousness.—W. S.

THEOSOPHY

THE SCIENCE OF RELIGION AND THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE

[K. R. Srinivasiengar, M. A., is a lecturer in the Philosophy Department of the Mysore Maharaja College. He tells us that he is indebted to Vivekananda's writings which removed the spell cast on him by his school, a Christian Church institute, under which Hinduism appeared to him hollow. "Blavatsky came very soon on my mental horizon: an old musty volume of *Isis Unveiled* was eagerly devoured." Then at the age of 19 he ran away "to the Tirupatti hills for practice of yoga! I sat there for 2 or 3 months but unfortunately I commenced at the wrong end of the matter, Hatha-Yoga, which so told upon my health that I had to return home to resume my college studies." Since then he has had a successful career and is "now working at a big thing 'The Metaphysics of Value.'" He adds that "the *Gita*, *Vedanta* and the *Secret Doctrine* are my consolations of Spirit, while western philosophy is my intellectual stamina."—EDS.]

Modern savants and philologists sometimes conjecture about the common source from which the different religious systems must have sprung, each absorbing the local colouring of its habitation and thus becoming distinct in course of time. This, however, is the teaching of Theosophy. Madame Blavatsky has described Theosophy as "the substratum and basis of all the world-religions and philosophies" (*Glossary*, p. 328). In her *Secret Doctrine* (I. xxxiv) she refers to "the universally diffused religion of the ancient and pre-historic world" and calls it the Secret Doctrine, which terms are equivalents of the Sanskrit Sanatana Dharma, Eternal Religion and Gupta Vidya, the Hidden Science. The proofs for this belief do not concern us here; I am interested in showing that Theosophy is a presentation in part of that Common Source and that it attempts to establish not only the fundamental unity of all ancient religions,

but also the synthesis of Science, Religion and Philosophy. Theosophy "is not a *religion* nor is its philosophy *new*" (*Ibid.*, xxxvi). It has however a double function to fulfil.

Religion is generally considered to be a string of dogmas without scientific validity and a set of practices without rational basis. Theosophy shows that the truths of religion are scientific facts, though modern science may not yet have discovered them all, and that its practices are mostly allegorical dramatization of such facts.

Similarly Theosophical definition makes science a companion to philosophy; and the logical deductions of science teachings cannot but lead to philosophy.

Once again philosophy is not merely a series of theoretical speculations in the Theosophical system; from philosophical fundamentals are derived ethical rules to be used in the conduct of everyday life, and thus Theosophy endows philosophy with religious

warmth.

In harmonising the claims of science, religion and philosophy, Theosophy aims at restoring the ancient view about the unity of all knowledge.

Many ancient religious books contain the story of cosmic and human evolution, derived from the source referred to above. Because of the abstruse nature of the teachings, allegories and symbols which require a key for a thorough understanding are used, and they are used just as our chemists and metamathematicians use their formulae. The key having been lost these symbols have assumed an esoteric character. Then there are other parts of the old teaching which are veiled in glyphs and ideographs for they are too dangerous in the hands of the profane.

Modern Theosophy is not only an exposition of the old synthesis of Science, Philosophy and Religion, but further it attempts to explain the allegories of the old books. It also speaks of the hidden or esoteric aspect of knowledge.

The beliefs of religions are corrupted shadows of old knowledge; religious rites and ceremonies being also corrupted and broken remnants of old traditions. Some of these beliefs and practices may appear to the scientific mind as superstitions, but Theosophy is able to lay bare their esoteric meaning, their rational explanation. Take for example the belief in heaven and hell (with rewards and punishments respectively) common to all religions.

Science may scorn it but only at the cost of abrogating its own claim to the scientific attitude of mind. Ours is not the only possible world in the universe. In fact, if we would substitute "a plane of existence" for the word "world," it is easily understandable that there are different planes of existence, even in connection with what we call our world. Science itself teaches that we are surrounded by myriads of invisible lives—microbes, bacteria, etc.,—invisible by reason of their minuteness. Is it not then equally possible that there may be beings which are equally invisible owing to the extreme tenuity of their texture? Their worlds need not necessarily be above or below our world. Madame Blavatsky explains (*S. D. I. 605*):—

When "other worlds" are mentioned—whether better or worse, more spiritual or still more material, though both invisible—the Occultist does not locate *these spheres* either *outside* or *inside* our Earth, as the theologians and the poets do; for their location is nowhere in the space *known* to, and conceived by, the profane. They are, as it were, blended with our world—interpenetrating it and interpenetrated by it. There are millions and millions of worlds and firmaments visible to us; there still greater numbers beyond those visible to the telescopes, and many of the latter kind do not belong to our *objective* sphere of existence. Although as invisible as if they were millions of miles beyond our solar system, they are yet with us, near us, *within* our own world, as objective and material to their respective inhabitants as ours is to us. But, again, the relation of these worlds to ours is not that of a series of egg-shaped boxes enclosed one within the other, like the toys called

Chinese nests; each is entirely under its own special laws and conditions, having no direct relation to our sphere. The inhabitants of these, as already said, may be, for all we know, or feel, passing *through* and *around* us as if through empty space, their very habitations and countries being interblended with ours, though not disturbing our vision, because we have not yet the faculties necessary for discerning them.

Just as a room may be filled with the rays of the sun, those of a lamp, X-rays, magnetic and electric vibrations and waves etc., each interpenetrating but not affecting the others, likewise the same portion of space may be occupied by several planes at one and the same time. The law of analogy and the law of continuity both force us to assume such a plurality of planes or states of existence. If this is admitted, then the "heaven" and "hell" of popular religions are simply different conditions of existence to which the souls of mortals who have "died" here "pass"—though in reality they are alive and right here. A soul, after discarding its material body, finds itself in a state of existence suited to its spiritual requirements. It is in its "heaven" or "hell" according to its old hopes, beliefs and longings of earth life. If it had done good deeds and longed for the joys of "heaven," it finds its "heaven" reproduced by its own imagination. The sinner who dies immersed in the desires and longings of his lower nature and believing in future punishments, would find himself surrounded by "fire and brimstone" images of his own mak-

ing. The experiences of happiness or suffering are real and help to develop the soul. In this sense, then, "heaven" and "hell" are, Theosophy tells us, real *states* but not places. To quote again from *The Secret Doctrine* (I, 221 ft. note.)

A world when called "a higher world" is not higher by reason of its location, but because it is superior in quality or essence. Yet such a world is generally understood by the profane as "Heaven," and located above our heads.

In a similar manner Theosophy explains the religious belief in gods, angels, spooks, etc. Science already admits that there is nothing "dead" in the universe, and Lloyd Morgan even holds that the mental is not derived from the physical but that the two series run concomitantly in such wise that every level of development in the physical is represented by its corresponding mental process (*Mind at the Cross-ways*, p. 50). Theosophy once again insists upon the law of continuity and argues that as this law of correlation of the physical and the psychical is true, we can say this in the words of *The Secret Doctrine* (I. 607):—

But, if we can conceive of a world composed (for *our* senses) of matter still more attenuated than the tail of a comet, hence of inhabitants in it who are as ethereal, in proportion to *their* globe, as we are in comparison with *our* rocky, hard-crust earth, no wonder if we do not perceive them, nor sense their presence or even existence.

It further states (I. 276):—

It is on the acceptance or rejection of the theory of the *Unity of all in Nature*, in its *ultimate Essence*, that mainly

rests the belief or unbelief in the existence around us of other conscious beings.

Theosophy thus supplies the key to the interpretation of fundamental religious truths.

When we turn to the achievements of modern science we find that many of its theories are inadequate unless illumined by the philosophic conceptions of Theosophy. Here again we can only illustrate our contention by taking an example or two regarding the ultimate nature of the universe. The latest utterances of men of science engender the hope that a time will soon come when the wisdom of the ancients will be justified by scientific labours. If this happens, the credit must go to Theosophy for having steadily pointed out that wisdom all these years, in spite of the calumny of H. P. Blavatsky and misunderstanding of her teachings, like unto the nuggets of pure gold. "Matter has disappeared," is now a well-worn scientific tag. Matter as hard indivisible bits called atoms disappeared long ago, but in their place came electrons or electric charges—still considered as particles—but now these particles themselves are discovered to be but centres of wave-disturbances; hence, the wave-theory of matter (Andrade, *The Mechanism of Nature*, pp. 163-66). On the other side, light waves also are discovered to be corpuscular in nature, thus marvellously confirming another of Madame Blavatsky's revelations, (*S. D. I*, 483 *et seq.*). The wave-disturbance is,

of course, only space in motion or space energised (*The Mechanism*, pp. 141-42). Thus space has come to be the one great reality of the universe for science, and time also, since motion involves time. But fifty years ago Mme. Blavatsky gave the philosophy of this conception in *The Secret Doctrine* (I, 14); naming the "one absolute Reality which antecedes all manifested conditioned being" as Be-ness, she wrote:—

This "Be-ness" is symbolised in the Secret Doctrine under two aspects. On the one hand, absolute abstract Space, representing bare subjectivity, the one thing which no human mind can either exclude from any conception, or conceive of by itself. On the other, absolute Abstract Motion representing Unconditioned Consciousness. (I, 14)

Also, on p. 37 there is a fine exposition of the inseparability of Time and Space and the conception of Duration;—one would mistake it for a passage in a modern work on Relativity!

But further, what is the nature of this reality—the inner stuff of this Space itself? Professor A. S. Eddington answers in *The Nature of the Physical World*, (p. 276 ff.)

I will try to be as definite as I can as to the glimpse of reality which we seem to have reached. the stuff of the world is mind-stuff. The mind-stuff of the world is, of course, something more general than our individual conscious minds, but we may think of its nature as not altogether foreign to the feelings in our consciousness.

And Bertrand Russell makes it still clearer in the *Analysis of Matter* (p. 320) wherein he says that part of the contents of a man's

brain consists of percepts, thoughts and feelings, and since his brain also consists of electrons, "we are compelled to conclude that an electron is a grouping of events and some of the events composing it are likely to be some of the mental states of the man to whom the brain belongs". Theosophy with a firmer grasp of the principles which underlie cosmic evolution, amplifies science by defining space itself, and Motion in space which is the life-process, evolution or manifestation. Since Divine Mind in Nature is still matter for conjecture and speculation on the part of scientists Mme. Blavatsky's explanations of what the Hindus called Mahat, Cosmic Intelligence and Akasha clarify our vision on the subject.

On the one hand Theosophy removes the dust of the ages gathered on old religions; on the other it removes the many accretions which confuse the issues of science; and it performs the dual function by the aid of a philosophy at once profound and practical.

Verily, then, Theosophy may well be called (*S. D. I*. 610) the "Thread Doctrine" (*Sutra-tma*):—

It passes through and strings together all the ancient philosophical religious systems, and reconciles and explains them all. We say now it does more. It not only reconciles the various and apparently conflicting systems, but it checks the discoveries of modern exact science, and shows some of them to be necessarily correct, since they are found corroborated in the ancient records.

K. R. SRINIVASIENGAR

To the public in general and the readers of the "Secret Doctrine" I may repeat what I have stated all along, and which I now clothe in the words of Montaigne: "I HAVE HERE MADE ONLY A NOSEGAY OF CULLED FLOWERS, AND HAVE BROUGHT NOTHING OF MY OWN BUT THE STRING THAT TIES THEM." Pull the "string" to pieces and cut it up in shreds, if you will. As for the nosegay of FACTS—you will never be able to make away with these. You can only ignore them, and no more.

— H. P. BLAVATSKY, *The Secret Doctrine*, Vol. I, p. xlvi.

NEW BOOKS AND OLD

REVOLUTION AND RELIGION *

LENIN OR GANDHI ?

[John Middleton Murry is examining the world-problem of to-day whose soul is morality, whose mind is politics and whose body is society. In this article he refers to the method of non-violent resistance of Gandhiji.—EDS.]

What is the fundamental problem in the Western world to-day? Some will say (quite truly) that it is the problem of distributing the vastly multiplied production of modern industry. But that formulation, though true, is dangerous. It abstracts economics from humanity, and encourages men to forget what they are only too anxious to forget, namely that the economic problem of a technological civilisation is ultimately a problem of morality. For the obstacle to the distribution of the product of modern industry is the instinctive adherence of innumerable men, in positions of absolute or relative economic privilege, to their own economic interests. Relative privilege in this order may be minimal; it may consist in one small degree of elevation above the subsistence line, the almost invisible distinction between quasi-independent poverty and complete pauperism: but the difference is enough to give a man the feeling that he has something to lose by radical economic change. On this instinctive conservatism of economic self-interest in the mass of the people, the possessors of real privilege can rely in times of crisis to preserve the *status quo* against any revolutionary change. Thus the economic problem merges into the political problem, and the political problem into the ethical. The striking originality of Reinhold Niebuhr's *Moral Man and Immoral Society*, which I will not hesitate to call a great book: a book likely to become a classic for the imaginative and courageous minority in these disillusioned days—is that, with complete fearlessness, it disentangles the true nature of the political and ethical problem which underlies the modern world-chaos. That problem is, almost invariably, falsely simplified into one of pure economics or pure morality. Hence the almost universal sense, among imaginative men that the religious solution is futile. It is felt by them that individual self-perfection, self-realisation through complete disinterestedness, which is the pinnacle of the pure religious achievement, is irrelevant to the problem which menaces the world. Yet, at the same time, they feel that the fundamentally

cynical solution offered by Leninist Communism is not merely one to which they cannot devote themselves without self-violation, but is also one which, by the extremity of its cynicism, will prove to be ineffectual in the Western world.

These two conflicting convictions are the common heritage of imaginative men to-day. Niebuhr is the first thinker, to my knowledge, who has faced them both without flinching. The title of his book sets forth the basic contradiction from which these conflicting convictions derive. *The morality of which the individual is capable is of a higher order than any morality of which the large social group is capable.* The achievement of complete disinterestedness, towards which the ethically conscious individual strives, and must strive, as the ideal, is unattainable by society as a whole, or by any large and powerful group in society. It follows, then, that the individual who expects disinterestedness of society, or of a large social group, is indulging in romantic illusion. Disinterestedness can be demanded by a man from himself alone; from society, and social groups, he can, if he is reasonable, expect, at the best, the pursuit of a qualified self-interest.

But it may be said (again truly) that the self-interest of the Western industrial nations demands precisely the equitable distribution of the product of industry which originally was posited as the problem of modern

technological society. This is a common evasion of the real problem of which even very intelligent people are guilty. The modern industrial nation is tacitly assumed to be a genuine *community*, and therefore capable of responding to the demands made by its self-interest, which (by hypothesis) is the interest of the community as a whole. This is pure self-deception. Those who embrace it assume the solution of the very problem they set themselves to solve: for the real problem is to create that genuine community, which would instinctively obey the interests of the community as a whole.

The Western industrial nations are not genuine communities. If they were, there would be no crisis, and no problem. Instead of communities, they are agglomerations of classes, united by sentiment, but divided by interest. Sentiment may be strong; but interest is far stronger. The rights of property—the interests of a class—prevail against the interest of the unborn community which demands that those rights should be abolished or drastically curtailed. It is the fact that it is built on this basic realisation which gives Marxian Communism the great influence it has in modern thought. Its "cynicism" comes far nearer to bedrock reality than any other theory of modern industrial society. It is not because of its cynicism that Marxism makes an enduring appeal, but because of its truth. Marxism is therefore a great contribution to the *ethical*

* *Moral Man and Immoral Society*, by Reinhold Niebuhr (Scribner's: \$2)

consciousness of mankind. For morality and self-deception are far asunder. Morality which refuses the truth is hypocrisy. And perhaps the most astonishing single merit of Niebuhr's book is the courage of its author—a professor at the Union Theological Seminary of New York, the greatest theological college in America—in proclaiming the essential verity of the Marxian analysis.

It is, of course, more surprising than it ought to be for a religious thinker to insist on the truth of Marx's insight. It is largely because religion has gone rotten in the West that men who call themselves religious are afraid of a social realisation that is implicit in the doctrines of the great mystics. Those who have learned from the mystics, and from their own religious experience, how profound are the ramifications of the Selfhood in the individual man, are not likely to be shocked by the realisation that self-interest dominates the life of society. Superficial religion is afraid of Marxism; but genuine religion is not. *Moral Man and Immoral Society* is a product of the genuine religion that is not afraid to admit the truth of Marxism; and it is, in my experience, unique.

So far from being afraid of Marxist Communism, Niebuhr has looked at it with perfect understanding—an understanding such as is hardly possible to the Marxist professed. To the Marxist, Marxism is the whole truth, and nothing but the truth. It is not that. It is three-quarters

of the truth—more of the truth than any political theory there has been in the Western world. But its refusal to admit the truth of the remaining quarter is full of danger. Because of this refusal, as Niebuhr truly says, modern Marxism is at once "the great promise and the great peril of the political life of the Western world." For, unless its cynicism is mitigated, it will intensify the instinctive hostility against it, and will finally repel even those who, by virtue of their imaginative detachment, would be prepared to work in the revolutionary cause with a party which based its realistic understanding of the modern situation on the principles of Marx.

For the aim of Marxian Communism, as Niebuhr truly says, is the social aim which must be approved as the highest by the moral conscience, namely, the establishment of equal justice. Nor can objection be taken to Marxism because it seeks to dislodge injustice by force. Ultimately, the socially unjustifiable privilege which is the basis of social injustice, is defended by power and can be weakened or destroyed only by power. But, just as the social reformers, who place their faith in the progress of education and enlightenment, deceive themselves by refusing to admit that men who possess privilege will not surrender it simply because they learn that their privilege is socially unjustified; so the Communists in the West deceive themselves by refusing to

see that the threat and practice of violence precipitates into the ranks of their enemies all those potential allies upon whose co-operation they must depend for their social revolution. Many thousands of middle-class men and women to-day, taught by events to examine the bases of a social system so manifestly inefficient and unjust, and to accept the necessity of a social revolution, are by their very capacity for imagination debarred from sympathy with a programme of violent revolution which, in the delicate organisation of a highly industrialised society, and against the resistance of a majority to which its own violence has given a specious moral sanction, would have all the horrors of a prolonged and indecisive civil war.

Thus the political problem with which the imaginatively realistic mind has to grapple in the West to-day is singularly complex. The power of economic privilege which is throttling society can be countered only by power. To rely on peaceful persuasion is illusionism; yet to rely on methods of violence is equally futile, because the serious threat of revolutionary violence will inevitably unite the majority of an industrial nation against the social revolution. What then? Must we accept the Marxian prophecy that revolution will only come when the majority of the nation becomes strict "proletariat"—that is, condemned to economic misery so desperate that a revolutionary upsurge is inevitable? It is im-

possible. The instinct of self-preservation in the privileged classes which has guarded them in the past, will guard them in the future against such egregious folly as completely to disinherit its proletariat: it will protect them, and its own privilege, by securing them (by unemployment insurance and the like) against that absolute misery which is the revolutionary explosive. And without that economic basis of a proletariat made desperate by misery, the party of revolutionary violence will make no real advance.

What then are those, who are convinced alike of the material and spiritual necessity of social revolution, to *do*? What is to be their political strategy? This is the practical issue which Niebuhr's deep-searching and, to my sense, unerring analysis of the material and spiritual factors in the Western situation brings him at last: and he calls in aid the shining example of Gandhi. He examines with the same lucidity and sympathy Gandhi's somewhat inconsistent formulations of his principles, and shows that the inconsistency is due to the uniqueness of Gandhi's effort, namely, to apply the noblest moral insights of the saint to the realistic problem of massing power against power. Niebuhr makes clear the very vital distinction between the non-resistance of the pure individualist pacifist, and the non-violent resistance which Gandhi employs, and he concludes:—

There is no problem of political life to which religious imagination can make a larger contribution than this problem of developing non-violent resistance. The discovery of elements of common human frailty in the foe, and, concomitantly, the appreciation of all human life as possessing transcendent worth, creates attitudes which transcend social conflict and thus mitigate its cruelties. It binds human beings together by reminding them of the common roots and similar character of both their vices and their virtues. These attitudes of repentance which recognise that the evil in the foe is also in the self, and these impulses of love which claim kinship with all men in spite of social conflict, are the peculiar gifts of religion to the human spirit. Secular imagination is not capable of producing them; for they require a sublime madness which disregards immediate appearances and emphasises profound and ultimate unities. It is no accident of history that the spirit of non-violence has been introduced into contemporary politics by a religious leader of the orient. The occident may be incapable of this kind of non-violent social conflict, because the white man is a fiercer beast of prey than the oriental. What is even more tragic, his religious inheritance has been dissipated by the mechanical character of his civilisation. The insights

of the Christian religion have become the almost exclusive possession of the more comfortable and privileged classes. These have sentimentalised them to such a degree, that the disinherited, who ought to avail themselves of their resources, have become so conscious of the moral confusions that are associated with them, that the insights are not immediately available for the social struggle in the Western world.

There is our tragedy. It is a most significant tribute to Gandhi that he should be the figure in whom the rigorous yet imaginative argument of Niebuhr's book inevitably culminates. Of the book itself I can only say that it seems to me of an altogether higher order than any other examination of the menacing problem of Western civilisation with which I am acquainted. It is a prophetic book: and I do not believe I shall be found the victim of romantic illusionism when I say that I believe it will prove to be forerunner of a new and enduring political movement in the English speaking world.

JOHN MIDDLETON MURRY

AUDACITY

THE PHILOSOPHY OF A RUSSIAN EXILE*

[R. Naga Raja Sarma, M. A., L. T., Ph. D. is Philosophy Lecturer in the Government College at Kumbhakonam.—EDS.]

Deeply dissatisfied with the dominance of reason with its jurisdiction over scientific and mathematical truths; convinced that ancient philosophers and their modern successors, hypnotized by Hellenic thought into an uncritical submission to the de-

mands of Reason, had converted Metaphysics into a narrow discipline under the pretence of vindicating the status of philosophy as "free" inquiry; and believing that one must redeem oneself through "faith" as St. Paul teaches, and through faith alone, *i. e.* through a spiritual exertion of quite peculiar nature, which we must describe as "audacity" (p. 239), which is bound to be ridiculed by Reason with as merry laughter as that with which a pretty Thracian woman witnessed Thales, the father of ancient philosophy, tumbling into a well—Leo Chestov, the Russian philosopher now living in exile cries halt to the riotous rationalism of the so-called exact positive sciences. He utters in grave tones the warning that if philosophy is to fulfil efficiently its legitimate function of ministering to the soul-needs, it should calmly and courageously repudiate the claims of Reason, which is worshipped by contemporary sciences. For the benefit of readers of THE ARYAN PATH, I propose to examine this doctrine of "Audacity" in the light of the "Vedanta" of which I dare say Leo Chestov knows the elements, though he makes a not very illuminating reference to Maya. (p. 229.)

I

Contending that Spinoza's formula "Deus=Natura=Substantia" is tantamount to a denial of God, and that the philosophy taught by Kant and Hegel owing allegiance to that Reason which rules over

triangles and perpendiculars is not free but fatally fettered, Leo Chestov in his "Foreword" (pp. xi to xxxi) maintains that until and unless "all the *prudendum ineptum*, and *impossibile* which our forefathers plucked from the tree in Paradise" are clean relegated to the limbo of oblivion along with "universally valid judgments" and "self-sufficient piety," Philosophy *qua free inquiry* would be impossible. In the first part entitled "Revelations of Death," Chestov examines the philosophy of Dostoevsky and of Tolstoy. The interrogation of Euripides "Who knows if life is not death and death life?" stands as the headline of Chestov's study of Dostoevsky. The Angel of Death gave Dostoevsky a second sight which revealed to him the disconcerting truth that life is death and death life. Dostoevsky's works bear ample testimony to an internal struggle to fit in or force that truth perceived by him through the instrumentality of second sight into the strait-jackets of "Omnitude," and his metaphysical message to mankind is: "One cannot demonstrate God. One cannot seek him in history. God is 'caprice' incarnate who rejects all guarantees. . ."

Tolstoy's *Diary of a Madman*, *Father Sergius*, *The Death of Ivan Ilych* and *Master and Man* are studied. "Activity, working for mankind, even the most useful, the most disinterested action, comes from the devil, and is worthless in the eyes of God.

* In *Job's Balances—On the Sources of the Eternal Truths*. By Leo Chestov, translated by Camilla Coventry and C. A. Macartney, with a note on the author by Richard Rees (J. M. Dent and Sons Ltd., London, 18s.)

Works, even the holiest, do not save the soul but destroy it." (pp. 106-7.) And "Down here on earth all was of importance, but there one wants something quite different . . . Let us flee to our dear Father-land . . . for thence we are come and there dwells our Father," would appear to be the revelation of death, according to Tolstoy.

In the second part containing 52 sections, under the general headline "Revolt and Submission," Chestov counsels abandonment of modesty and advocates the cause of "audacity" with force and brilliance. The 49th section entitled "Sola Fide" constitutes, in my view, a confession of philosophic faith by Chestov. Faith and *not* Reason (which guarantees twice-two being four) is to guide the destiny of man.

The third part "On the Philosophy of History" has four essays respectively dealing with "Spinoza in History," "Pascal's Philosophy," "Plotinus's Ecstasies," and "Ethics and Ontology". Chestov arraigns Spinoza for the offence of having slain God, and observes that Spinoza "was slaying Him at His own divine free command and of his own un-free human will," of course in the light of the equation Deus=Natura=Substantia which is so obnoxious to Chestov. Pascal's philosophy exhorts us not to seek strength or assurance in this bewitched world. The mystic experience (glimpses of which may be found in Pascal's *Pensées* and the *Enneads* of Plotinus) know nothing of human

laws, compulsions and constraints. In the concluding essay Chestov answers some criticisms urged by Prof. Hering on his "Memento Mori".

II

These conclusions of Chestov sketched above are adequate to enable one to accompany the champion of the principle of "audacity" in his "pilgrimage through souls"; but one is entitled to ask what reward awaits the pilgrims at the end of the pilgrimage. With Chestov's conclusion that the truth lies in the Scriptures, the Vedanta will agree, substituting the Vedas and the Upanishads, for the Bible. That the present life is death and death is life will be easily granted. The existence dominated by "*a priori* synthetic judgments," mathematical truths, scientific victories, is ignorance-ridden. It is enveloped in Cimmerian darkness. When the ordinary folk governed by Reason and Ethics imagine that they are awake, the genuine seer is fast asleep. When the folly-ridden folk are asleep, the seer is awake. (*Yanisa-sarvabhootanam-tasyam jagarti-samyamee—Yasyam-jagratibhootani-sa-nisa-pasyatomuneh. Gita*, ii-69.) When Chestov condemns reason and self-evidence as "nothing but a mere 'assouppissement et enchantement surnatural,'" and wants acceptance of the principle that "God blinds some and enlightens others" he has the support of the Upanishads. The *Katha Upanishad* emphatically asserts that only he whom God

selects can reach Him, and that Reason is hardly competent to yield higher knowledge. (*Yame-vaisha-vrinute-tena-labhyah-Nai-shatarkena-matih. . . Katha-2-9 and 22.*)

III

Chestov makes much of the legend of the Fall and repeats *ad nauseam* that Reason and Ethics are due to eating of the forbidden fruit. This would hardly solve any philosophical problem. Old Khayyam has out-Chestoved Chestov in an adroit apotheosis of "Audacity" under the dynamic urge of which he cries aloud to God to take man's forgiveness for all the sins with which man's face is blackened, and give man His forgiveness. It would appear from Chestov's account that when the Angel of Death arrives "before time," he gives his victims second sight, but in ninety-nine out of a hundred cases, the Angel arrives just in time and does his work without troubling to give his victims the said second sight. Revelations of death do not help one in the cultivation of steadfast adherence to the gospel of "Audacity". Death is the goal of life. Another life is the goal of death. Unless Chestov admits some such doctrine, his own theodicy, grounded though it be on "Audacity," will not have a better fate than the theodicies against which he delivers furious onslaughts. Death is the most natural thing, the only end to life or lives till one perfects himself or enjoys his inherent spiritual bliss, (*Jatasyahi-dhruvo-mrityuh-dhruvam—janmamrita-*

sya—chaBahoonam—janmanam-ante-Jnyanavan-mam-prapadyate—Gita.) The principles of "Audacity" again must fail to account for the fact that God was not justified in permitting the Evil One to tempt Job and involve him in all sorts of difficulties. A theodicy grounded on "Audacity" renders the cosmic mystery simply more mysterious.

IV

One may be a thorough-going misologist. One may completely repudiate the claims of Reason. One may be an ardent advocate of "Audacity". Unless, however, this "Audacity" is shown to be capable of explaining satisfactorily the facts of life and the hopes of the hereafter, its pragmatic and philosophical value may not be great. The Vedanta views life or Samsara—recurring cycles of births and deaths—as beginningless in time—*Anadi*. The Universe of organised and unorganised matter and spirit is manifestation of the Supreme Spirit—Vishnu or Siva according to theological predilections and presuppositions—who administers the karmic law. Evil, difference in endowment and equipment, victimisation, exploitation, the Dualisms of true and false or valid and invalid in the theory of knowledge, of the moral and the immoral in ethics, of the beautiful and the ugly in aesthetics, of activity and passivity in volition—are all traceable in the last analysis to the respective karma done by individuals. Countless

lives will have to be gone through. The Supreme Power has an Infinite number of Infinite attributes of which *Sat*, *Chit*, and *Ananda* (Existence, Knowledge, and Bliss) can in a way be grasped by finite man. The inherent bliss of individuals is beclouded by evil and good karma. The stock of karma is to be exhausted without a residue. *Sravana*, (study of scripture) *Manana*, (mental rehearsal) *Nididhyasana*, (contemplation) and *Samadhi* (Yogic concentration of attention on the Supreme) are means of Final Realisation of the majesty of the Supreme Being. Actions good and bad bind the individual, but done in a spirit of disinterested dedication to the Lord, they do not bind him. In the light of the Vedantic doctrines sketched above, the principle of "Audacity" pales into insignificance.

Sankara, the monarch of Indian monistic metaphysics, regarded the universe as a colossal appearance due to Fontal Folly. Madhva the champion of pluralistic theism and realism insisted on the execution of a dynamic spiritual programme for final realisation, and freedom from the ills of recurring cycles of births and deaths.

Chestov solemnly observes that Tolstoy one dark night fled from his home "not knowing whither or wherefore". (p. 138.) Death is the goal of life according to the Vedanta, and in strict obedience to the Law of Karma which no amount of "Audacity" could violate individuals will pass

through a series of births and deaths till the final Realisation of one's inherent Bliss is attained.

V

The Vedanta will endorse Chestov's opinion that the truth lies in the Scriptures, especially the truth that is not accessible to the senses. The last word on this subject was uttered by the author of the Vedanta Sutra in the *Sastra-Yonitva-Adhikarana*. That Spinoza proclaimed a lie to mankind and that he slew God are simply rhetorical rodomontade which may not enhance the philosophical prestige of Chestov. But assuming for purposes of this estimate of Chestov's philosophy that all he says against the contributions of Descartes, Spinoza, Kant and Hegel is just, fair, and well-grounded, how does his "Audacity" enable one to have a philosophy of life, a theodicy, and how does it direct daily conduct? "Audacity" lynches Negroes, violates the Belgian neutrality, perpetrates untold atrocities in the Congo basin, laughs at the League of Nations; and Pascal and Plotinus, Tolstoy and Tertulian have vanished. That need not disconcert us. Those who live have obvious duties to themselves and their fellowmen. One has a duty to enrich the secular and spiritual life not merely of oneself but of others as well. Works good and bad bind only when the doer or the agent avariciously covets the consequences. The essential, fundamental and foundational nature of the self

finite and Infinite (*Jivatma* and *Paramatma* as the *Nyaya-Vaisheshika* has it) is beyond good and evil. But so long as finite individuals live, move and have their being here, and vegetate cribbed, cabined, and confined, they will have to adhere to a programme of secular and spiritual activity with clear and distinct consciousness (I use these terms though Chestov reacts to them as a bull to a red rag) that their actions and innermost thoughts are under the surveillance of the Supreme Lord who cannot be hoodwinked by "Audacity". Such is the quintessence of the *Gita* doctrine of "Karma-Yoga". Of course, Sankara demands "Karma-Sanyasa," riddance of all works good and bad. But then he admits the value of a programme of action *sub specie temporis*.

Chestov's dithyrambic lament that the path of Reason leads to an exaltation of Ethics and the repudiation or subordination of Ontology is as "audacious," as amusing. Some ethical discipline is indispensable and obligatory on all. Deity is not "Caprice incarnate". Law is as much Its Infinite Attribute as Caprice. It guides the destinies of individuals, and nations in accordance with Karma individual and collective. It has no malice. Favouritism is unknown to It. (*Vaishamya-nairghrinya-adhikarana*—Vedanta Sutra.)

Reason may very well pave the way for the emergence of higher powers and spiritual visions. The *Nyaya-Vaisheshika* made use of Reason to demonstrate the exist-

ence of God. Condemnation of Reason, while Chestov's "Audacity" and "Suddenly" are so nebulous and unable to place in the hands of man "a balance hitherto unknown to man in which Job's sorrow really weighs more than the heavy sands of the sea," (p. 367) is a polemical or controversial legerdemain. The Lord says to Arjuna that He would bestow on him a divine vision, (*Divya-chakshuh*) specially for a specific occasion, of exhibition of the Lord's Cosmic Form. (*Visva-roopa-pradarsana*.) If that momentary vision of the Glory of the Lord should be converted into a precious life-possession, Reason, and Ethics grounded on Reason cannot be repudiated and overthrown.

I rather think it is time to conclude. Chestov claims that his "Audacity" would unlock the door to which Old Khayyam "found no key" but the Vedanta asserts that Reason (*Yukti*), Audacity (*Dhairya-Kaschit-dhherah* etc. *Katha*. iv-1), Ethics, and consistent and courageous pursuit of means of final realisation (*Sravanadisadhana-anushtana*), are *all* equally important and indispensable for deserving and earning final emancipation from the recurring cycles of births and deaths. Riddance of all Karmic residue means enjoyment of unalloyed bliss ever in the service of the Lord. *Cui est credendum*, Chestov or Vedantic seers? I feel sure readers of THE ARYAN PATH are in a position to decide for themselves. My comments

notwithstanding, Chestov's work is a stinging challenge to modern life. It is superb and brilliant, genuinely more philosophic than many of the namby-pamby performances of lotus-eating thinkers occidental and oriental, and of pinchbeck authors and metaphy-

sicians who are suffering from an entirely needless reputation and who are groaning under the weight of greatness thoughtlessly thrust on them by the multitude. Chestov's "Audacity" has a prominent place under the Sun.

R. NAGA RAJA SARMA

PROF. JACKSON ON MANI AND MANICHAËISM*

[Dr. Sir Jivanji J. Modi has already been our honoured contributor and is too well-known in east and west to need any introduction.—EDS.]

Two religious heresies disturbed greatly the Sassanian rule and people of Persia. (1) Mazdakism or the heresy of Mazdak and (2) Manichaeism or the heresy of Mani.

Mazdakism arose in the reign of Kobad in the early part of the sixth century A. C. It was started by Mazdak, a minister of Kobad. Mazdak was the first Iranian Socialist.† He had persuaded Kobad, his royal master, to join his creed. His socialism was of a very bad type, because, in preaching on the community of property, he recommended the community of womanhood also. He lowered the status of marriage ties. Kobad's son Khosro (afterward Chosroes I, known as Anoushirwan or Noshirwan the Just) saved his royal father and the country from the clutches of Mazdakism. Mazdak

was put to death in 528 A. C. On coming to the throne, Chosroes called a number of *bazams* or assemblies of the learned of the country to discuss this and other social and religious questions. These *bazams* were like our modern "conferences". In the matter of its after-effects, this heresy of Mazdak was nothing compared to the heresy of Mani. It is on the subject of the belief of this heretic Mani that we have a recent learned publication from Prof. A. V. Williams Jackson.

Prof. Jackson is a "thoroughgoing" man. "Thorough" is, as it were, his watchword. He is a thorough student, a thorough scholar, a thorough writer, and a thorough traveller. He has thoroughly shown his thoroughness in all its parts in the present publication. A full contents and bibliography are followed by a brief

sketch, which, though brief, is for ordinary readers, full of information on Manichaeism and its history. Then follow his translations of Turfan Pahlavi Manichaean fragments with texts. Part III contains matters specially interesting to Parsi students, as therein he gives his own reading and translations, with notes, of the passages in the Pahlavi Shikhand Gumanik Vijar and the Dinkard referring to Manichaeism.

Prof. Jackson's reference to his *shisyas* as a *guru* is touching. As he says, it well reminds a Parsi of the relationship between the *aêthrya* (pupil) and his teacher (*aêthrapaiti*). The Parsi Meher Yasht speaks of this relationship or friendship between the teacher and his pupils as being above all other friendships and as being nearest to friendship between two relatives. It speaks of this friendship as seventy-fold (*hap-taithivâo antarê aethra-paiti*. s. 116). How pleasant to find that, thanks to God, Prof. Jackson has produced a galaxy of good *aêthryas*; and they have all, as the ancient good *shisyas*, good *chelâs*, stood by the side of their *aêthrya-paiti*, their *guru*.

THE SOURCES OF INFORMATION ON MANICHAËISM

Up to about thirty years ago, there were three sources of information on Manichaeism: (1) Early Church Fathers, (2) Mahomedan writers, like Maçoudi, and (3) Parsi Pahlavi writers.

1. Of these three classes of informants, the first, the early Christian Fathers wrote, not with

a view to give any account of, or information about, Manichaeism, but—Manichaeism, being a rival of Christianity—with a view to refute it.

2. The Mahomedan writers wrote, not with a view to refutation, because Manichaeism, having been mostly driven from Persia, had retired to the East and North-east, to the regions of Turkestan and adjoining parts of Central Asia. That being the case, Manichaeism was no rival to Mahomedanism.

3. As to the Parsi Pahlavi writers, they, like the early Christian Fathers, wrote with a view to fight against Manichaeism which threatened to become, and for some time actually became, a great heresy in the midst of Zoroastrianism. So, though not an actual rival of Zoroastrianism, it had begun to act against the Iranian Renaissance—social, political, and religious—founded by Ardeshir Babegan who had come to the throne of Persia in 212 A. C. and founded the Sassanian dynasty. Ardeshir died in about 242 A.C. Mani (216–276) flourished, with his heresy, a little after Ardeshir's death, and troubled the reign of Shapur who carried on, with some rigour, the Renaissance begun by his father. The Renaissance, as in the case of all renaissances, was not universally liked. For example, Jasnafshah, the King of Tabaristan, a dependent king, had, in his letter to Dastur Tansar or Taosar, the Prime Minister of Ardeshir, protested against what

* *Researches in Manichaeism, with special Reference to the Turfan Fragments*, by A. V. WILLIAMS JACKSON, Professor of Indo-Iranian Languages in Columbia University (1932).

† *Vide* my paper "Mazdak, the Iranian Socialist" in the Dastur Dr. Hoshang Jamasp Memorial Volume. *Vide* my "Memorial" Papers pp. 112 *et seq.*

may loosely be called a kind of caste-system rigidly sought to be introduced.* It was a kind of caste-system, purely based on profession, the like of which, at one time, prevailed even among the ancient Romans.†

Thus this heresy of Mani was a great event in the religious history of Persia. Though punished and persecuted, it continued long in Persia. Being a kind of an offshoot of Zoroastrianism, though not a rival of Zoroastrianism, it continued long in Persia, and influenced even some Zoroastrians.

ATTEMPT TO FOUND AN ECLECTIC FAITH

Several attempts have been made, now and then, here and there, to found an eclectic faith. Ptolemy had made such an attempt in Egypt. Akbar had made one in India which was less successful than that of Ptolemy. Manichaeism was such an attempt in Persia. Some attempts are made, even nowadays, here and there, of founding a Universal Brotherhood, with a kind of faith which is "a synthesis of elements from various existing religions". The attempts are to form, if not exactly a new religion, a new kind of belief or faith. Of these modern attempts, the one of the present Mazdaznans of America, who have now spread in Great Britain and other parts of Europe, is an

instance. It reminds us more of Manichaeism than any other attempts, if not in all its beliefs, in its formation. Like Manichaeism, it has taken some elements from Zoroastrianism and some from Christianity. I have given in a letter in Gujarati in the *Jam-e-Jamshed* Bombay an account of my visit to one of their sittings in July 1925. (Letter 41 of my travels in 1925.)

MANI

Mani, a Mazdayacnan and a Parthian Arsacid by birth, was born in 216 A. C. near Bagdad, of a father who, himself, was somewhat of an eclectic in religious views. He made his first appearance as a new eclectic and preacher in March 242 A. C. on the coronation day of Shapur I. His heretical preachings led Shapur to expel him from his country within a few years after. So, he went out preaching his new faith in various countries like Northern India, Tibet, Chinese Turkestan and Khorasan. He went on preaching, as well as learning, especially from some Indian sources. By that time, perhaps, the clamour against his new teaching, which of course had many Zoroastrian elements, was toned down a little, and when he returned to Persia, Shapur's son Hormuzd who reigned for a very short time (272 to 273) looked on his preaching with a tolerant

or indulgent spirit. Hormuzd's successor, Behram I, was not of such tolerant spirit, and unable to oppose the trend of public feeling, put him to death in 274 A. C.—about 32 years after his first appearance as a preacher. The ancient Persians on the whole were a tolerant people. Had it not been so, Christianity would not have spread so much in Sassanian Persia. But the manner of Mani's death, that of being flayed alive, if true, may be taken as a black spot upon Persian toleration.

THE SPREAD OF MANICHAISM

I think very few religious sects have spread their influence so far and wide or exercised so enduring an after-influence as Manichaeism. Even by the time of Mani's death, his teaching had spread far and wide, if not so much in Persia itself, much in the East and in the West, where it had become, a powerful rival to Christianity.

In the matter of religion, Persia has been more than once a peril to the West. Even before the appearance of Christianity, the puritanical form of its religion had influenced the West. The ancient Persians are spoken of as "The Puritans of the Old World". The Rev. Charles Kingsley, while speaking of the Egyptian religion of the time of Ptolemy I, says:—

The Old Egyptian gods had grown in his dominions very unfashionable, under the summary iconoclasm to which they had been subjected by the Mono-

theist Persians—the Puritans of the Old World as they have been called.*

Capt. Little, while speaking of the modern Parsis of India, speaks of their progenitors of Persia as "the Puritans of the East".† Of the possible Puritan influence of Persia upon Greece, Max Müller said:—

There were periods in the history of the world when the worship of Ormuzd threatened to rise triumphant on the ruins of the temples of all other gods. If the battles of Marathon and Salamis had been lost, and Greece had succumbed to Persia, the state religion of the empire of Cyrus, which was the worship of Ormuzd, might have become the religion of the whole civilized world. Persia had absorbed the Assyrian and Babylonian Empires; the Jews were either in Persian captivity or under Persian sway at home; the sacred monuments of Egypt had been mutilated by the hands of Persian soldiers. The edicts of the king,—the king of the kings—were sent to India, to Greece, to Scythia, and to Egypt, and if "by the grace of" Ahura Mazda, Darius had crushed the liberty of Greece, the purer faith of Zoroaster might easily have superseded the Olympian fables.‡

After this there was Mithraism which spread as a rival to Christianity and led the Christian bishops, in order to secure the stability of Christianity, to adapt many of their Christian beliefs to the beliefs and requisites of Mithraism, even to the extent of adopting the 25th of December, at first a Mithraic religious seasonal festival, as the birth (natal) day of Christ. Such being the case, the new faith of Mani of Persia was another peril for Christian Europe.

* It was not altogether a new introduction because Jamshed is said to have introduced it, hundreds of years ago. *Vide* my paper "Was there any Institution in Ancient Iran like that of Caste in India?" (*Jour. Anthropological Society of Bombay*, Vol. XIII No. 8, pp. 816-822. *Vide* my *Anthropological Papers*, Part IV, pp. 199-205.)

† *Vide* the chapter on "The Caste System in Rome," in "The End of the Ancient World," by Mr. Ferdinand Lot, pp. 100 *et seq.*

* *Alexandria and her School* (1854) by Rev. Charles Kingsley.

† *A Narrative of the Operations of Capt. Little's Detachment* (1794) p. 334.

‡ Max Müller's *Chips from a German Workshop*, Vol. I, p. 162.

MANICHAISM LOSING ITS ORIGINAL
ASPECT WITH ITS SPREAD
OUT OF PERSIA

I think that Prof. Jackson is right in saying:—

Perhaps it [Manichaeism] preserved a more original aspect in the region that gave it birth, the Babylonian province of the Persian Empire and its environs. (p. 17)

I would remove the word "perhaps" from his sentence and say that it seems to be really so. The Manichaeism, as now presented by the previous Zoroastrian, Christian and Mahomedan writers, jointly with the newly discovered writings, may be taken as a little different from what he taught at first on the Persian soil. It seems that, when driven from the Persian soil, he went towards the East,—towards Turkestan,—not only preaching his beliefs, but also learning further some other beliefs.

Prof. Jackson's account of its spread in the West up to distant Spain, where it went marching across both the shores of the Mediterranean, is interesting. "The Priscillianists of Spain were tinged by Manichaeism."* (p. 18). The Albigenses were an offshoot of them.† It is very strange that Manichaeism, though itself dead as a separate belief, is said to have left its influence on much later Christian sects such as the Paulicians of Armenia and

Asia Minor which were seats of Manichaeism in early times and the Bogomils of Bulgaria.‡

The Paulicians sprung up in Armenia in the second half of the seventh century. Their founder Constantine belonged to a dualistic community. He was drawn to his new heretic belief by the epistles of Paul. Hence the name of the sect. He died about 684. One may, or may not, see in Paul's epistles, anything of the strict dualism of Manichaeism, but this seems to be a case of how one reads his own thoughts in another's writings.

They held the ordinary dualistic doctrine common to all the Manichaeans, expressly distinguishing the Being to whom the present world owes its creation and government from the maker and ruler of that which is to come.

As to the Bogomils of Bulgaria their name means "friends of God," wherein the syllable *bog* reminds us of the Iranian *baga* God (Indian *bhagavan*, Slavonic *bog*). It was a later heretical sect of the Greek Church prevalent in Bulgaria in the twelfth century. They also like the main sect, the Manichaeans, with its offshoots, the Albigenses and the Paulicians suffered persecutions.

THE ELEMENTS OF HIS
MANICHAISM

Prof. Jackson gives us an excellent general outline of Mani-

chaeism (pp. 7-16). This outline leads us to indulge in various thoughts. He says:—

The religion of Mani . . . was distinctly and designedly a synthesis. Among his spiritual predecessors he especially acknowledged Zoroaster, Buddha and Jesus as pioneer revealers of the truth which he came to fulfil. (p. 17)

Mani tried to do in Persia, what Ptolemy I had partially succeeded in doing in Egypt and what Akbar failed to do in India. He wanted to produce and preach an eclectic faith having the elements of Zoroastrianism, Christianity and even of Buddhism. Buddhism had advanced to the doors of Persia, though it had not entered into the heart of Persia proper. It had influenced even some important personages, and we learn from a recent book,* on the Religious History of China, that it was an Iranian prince, the Parthian prince An-shihkao, who first preached Buddhism in China.

The so called dualism of the Zoroastrians—the conflict between Spenta-Mainyu and Angra-Mainyu—was at the bottom of Mani's teachings, though not in Zoroastrian wording. He claimed to be the Paraclete—the Comforter, Consoler, Intercessor—referred to by Jesus Christ. Some Indian, old Babylonian, and Mandaean

beliefs with Hellenistic Gnostic features† were intermixed. As to Mandaism, I think, in it again, there was more a varnish of Zoroastrianism because Mandaism itself was a mixture and had more of Zoroastrian than other elements.‡

Mani had divided his followers into two classes. The formation of the upper—the Elect or Perfect—who were asked to live a life of celibacy and austerity, points much to the influence of Buddhism.

THE TWO PRINCIPLES OF ZOROASTRIANISM BELIEVED TO HAVE
SPECIALLY INFLUENCED MANI

Among the different elements of Zoroastrianism, the belief in the two Principles seems to have especially influenced Mani. In the text, with translation, of the Berlin manuscript, as well as in the Stein manuscripts, given by Le Coq,§ the Sun-god and Light are often referred to. Mr. Fisk of America thought that the two principles assigned to Mithra, the Sun-god, led to the Manichaean heresy. Mrs. Murray-Aynsley, says:¶

Zoroaster (Zerdusht) assigned to Mithra, the sun-god of the Persians, two principles and made those exercise two distinct forces, each independent of the other, under the names of Ormuzd (good) and Ahriman (evil). This, in time,

* A History of the Religious Beliefs and Philosophical Opinions in China, from the Beginning to the Present time, by Dr. Leo Wieger, S. J. (1927) p. 66.

† p. 7

‡ Vide my Paper on the Mandaeans in the *Journal of the K. R. Cama Oriental Institute* No. 23.

§ J. R. A. S. Vol. for 1911 Article VIII pp. 280 et seq.

¶ *Symbolism of the East and West* by Mrs. Murray-Aynsley, with Introduction by Sir George Birdwood (1900) p. 18.

* The followers of Priscillian, a bishop of Spain "who embraced some of the errors of the Gnostics" and who was arraigned as an heretic and put to death in 385 A. C.

† For a brief account of Mani's doctrine and its relation to the Albigenses, *Vide* my Gujarati work, entitled "Future Life or the Immortality of the Soul" (ભવિષ્યની જીવંતી અથવા અમરતા) 1889 pp. 107-8 n. I.

‡ *Encycl. Britt.* 9th Ed., Vol. 18, pp. 433-34.

in the opinion of Mr. Fiske (the American upholder of the Darwinian theories), produced the Manichaeism heresy, in which the devil appears as an independently existing principle of evil; and thus in part at least, was continued the old Asiatic worship of the sun in comparatively modern Europe. The heresy, says Mr. Fiske, "was always rife in Armenia; it was through Armenian missionaries that Bulgaria was converted from Heathenism, and from thence, Manichaeism penetrated into Servia and Bosnia, which latter was its headquarters from the twelfth century onwards, and was a perpetual thorn in the side of the Papacy."

A MANICHAEAN CONFESSION PRAYER

The connection between Manichaeism and Zoroastrianism reminds us of the Manichaean Prayer of Confession,* and the Zoroastrian Patet Pashimáni† or prayer of repentance or confession, which is compared with the Patimokkha‡ of Buddhism. The Manichaean Confession Prayer is said to be of "a relatively more recent date."§ It consists "of an enumeration of possibly committed sins, for which forgiveness is being

implored. This enumeration comprehends fifteen articles or counts each being introduced by the words, the Second, the Third etc."¶ The prayer was intended for "the auditores or Manichaean laymen."§

It is the form of some parts of the Manichaean confession, that reminds us of the Parsi Patet. A form, similar to the following, often recurs in the Manichaean Confession:

My God! If in our sinful condition we unwittingly should somehow have been infractors against, or causers of discontent in the Five-God by a bad and wicked mind . . . now my God cleansing ourselves from sin we pray *manastar hirza*.** (i.e. our sin remit.)

The Patet of the Parsis also has a formula of Confession and it enumerates all possible sins.†† The word literally means "going back" or receding from the transgression of the law; and so it corresponds to the Hebrew T'shubâh which also means returning or going back. (1) The Manichaean Confession commences with

* For this Manichaean Prayer of Confession, *Vide* the late Mr. A. V. Le Coq's article "Dr. Steins Turkish Khuastuanift frun Tun Huang, being a Confession-prayer of the Manichaean auditores." *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society*, Vol. for 1911 article VIII. pp. 277 et seq.

† For the Zoroastrian Patet Pashimáni, *vide* Spiegel's Avesta Part III, Khordeh Avesta. Bleek's Translations p. 153.

‡ The Patimokkha of the Buddhists is their book in which are summed up the rules and directions which they have to follow and the disregard of which is a sin. "It is regarded with much reverence by the monks, from its having from times immemorial been ordered to be read twice monthly in every monastery." *Encycl. Br.*, 9th Ed. Vol. IV p. 434 col. 2. Dr. T. W. Rhys Davids gives, in the above article on Buddhism, a brief account of the rules and directions. It is said to have been composed earlier than, or about the time of, Asoka's Council about 250 B. C.

§ *Jour. R. A. S. Op. Cit.* p. 278.

¶ *Ibid* p. 279.

§ *Ibid* p. 280.

** These words in the Manichaean Prayer of Confession which we find in Dr. Le Coq's Text are said by him to be words of the Middle Persian or Cuneiform language. If so, I think 'Mana' is Middle Persian *mana*, mine; *star* is Middle Persian *star* to sin; *hirza*, from a root, corresponding to Avesta *har* (Lat. *salvere*, to save) or Avesta *harez*, to leave off, to let lie.)

†† *Vide* my Religious Ceremonies and Customs of the Parsis.

"Khormuzta the God and the Five God."* (2) The Parsi Patet commences with five Yathâ Ahu Vairyo (Yatha Ahu Vairyo panja). The Parsi Yatha Ahu Vairyo, being the oldest Mazdayasnan prayer, a pre-Zoroastrian formula of prayer, is something like the Word of God. The Parsi Patet has eleven *kardehs* or sections. (3) All possible sins are mentioned in the Patet, one after another, and each *kardeh* ends, as in the case of the Manichaean Confession, with a similar or somewhat similar form of repentance, *viz*:—

If I have been sinful of that (sin), O God! I repent of all the sins committed through thought, word and action, physical sins, or spiritual sins, sins related to this world or to the next world. I repent with three words—i. e. *manashni*, *gavashni*, *kunashni*, (thought, word and deed). I repent by saying the Patet.

The Khormuzta, the God in the Manichaean Confession prayer above referred to, seems to be another form of Hormaza (Ahura Mazda). The first part *khormuzta* when written in Pahlavi can be read as *hor* and *vice versa*.

REFERENCES TO MANICHAISM IN PAHLAVI BOOKS

We said above, that Prof. Jackson has referred to two Pahlavi books, and given their texts and translations with notes, which refer to Manichaeism. The

first is Shikand Gumanik Vajar.† He has given the early part of the portion which refers to Manichaeism. The second is the Dinkard.‡

The Shikand Gumanik Vajar says that Mani had thousands of delusions. (a) Among these delusions is one which we often hear now, *viz*. "Man is a two-footed animal." Mani seems to be the first who said something like this. He said: "Mankind are two-legged demons, and animals four-legged."§ (mardum dev-i do pâ-va gusfand chehâr-pâyân. s. 15.) (b) Again, we nowadays speak of microcosm and macrocosm. We find something of this kind in Mani's teaching. He said:—

He (Ahriman) arranged this Little World which, like mankind and cattle (and) other living creatures is a wholly-copied replica of the Great World, with the other embodied creation. (s. 24)¶

(c) Our Jain readers will be interested in one of the teachings of Mani justifying the non-killing of living things. He says that killing animals is the work of Ahriman. So, when you kill a living being, you do the work of Ahriman. (ss. 42-45)

Two of the ten teachings of Mani as given in the Dinkard draw our special attention. (1) In the second teaching we find a tinge of Mazdakism. (2) Adarbad recommended marriage with a

* *Jour. R. A. S. Op. cit.* p. 280.

† Chap. XVI. S. B. E. Vol. XXIV, pp. 243 et seq. *Vide* Shikand-Gumanik Vajar. The Pazand-Sanskrit Text together with a fragment of the Pahlavi, by Hoshang Jamsasp and West (1887) p. 167 et seq.

‡ Bk. III. Subject 200. Dastur Peshotan's Volume V, Text pp. 242-43. Translation (English) pp. 315-17. Trans. Gujarati, pp. 295-97. D. M. Madon's Edition, Vol. I, pp. 216-10.

§ Jackson p. 177.

¶ *Ibid* p. 179.

§ No. 3 in Jackson's list; p. 205, No. 2 in Dastur Peshotan's list, Vol. V Text p. 242.

woman of good family (nishman min tokhma). Mani recommended marriage with any woman, even out of good family (nishman minach bara tokhma).^{*} In other words, he recommended marriage even out of community. In the portion of the Dinkard referring to Manichaeism, Mani is represented as opposing the teachings of the Primate, Adarbad Maraspand.[†]

The Dinkard has other references to Mani. (1) The first is in Bk. V,[‡] where Mani is referred to with Alexander, Zohak, Messiah who were disturbers (varvishan-varân) of belief. (2) The Dinkard's second reference to Mani is in the 9th book. It says that a chapter of the book (mentioned below in the foot-note) treats of the evil teachings of Mani.

The Shayast la shayast ¶ makes three classes of religions :

(a) The pure laws of religions (avizeh dât)[§]

(b) Mixed religions (gomizeh dât)

(c) Low or bad religions (vatar dat)

This division is something like

our modern division "good, bad and indifferent". Among the first class, the good, the writer takes his own religion, the veh-din, i. e. the Zoroastrian religion. Among the third class, the bad, he takes the Zandists (zindik), the Christian (Tarsâk) and the Jews (Yahud). Among the second class, the (mixed), he takes the *Sinik*, i. e. the Chinese. This Chinese is, as suggested by Darmesteter,^{**} the Manichaeism. The Epistles of Manuschihar seem to connect Manichaeism with the country of China.

The Epistles of Manuschehr^{††} refer to Manichaeism indirectly, Manuschihar was the head priest of the Parsis in Persia in the ninth century A. C. (The third epistle is dated 881 A. C.). His brother, Zadsparam, was the High priest of the Zoroastrians of Sarakh "in the extreme north of Khorassan where he seems to have been associated with heretical Tughazghus," who were, as pointed out by Maçudi, Manichaeans in belief. Having been thus associated, Zadsparam introduced several

* Jackson's list No. 5. Dastur Peshotan's No. 5 Text; No. 4 Guj. Translation.

† Mani lived from 216 to 274. He flourished in the reign of Shapur I, who reigned from 240 to 271. Adarbad Maraspand was a great primate in the latter part of the reign of Shapur I and in the reign of his son Hormuzd.

‡ Bk. V, Chap. III 3. West, S. B. E. Vol. 47, p. 126; Dastur Peshotan's Dinkard, Vol. IX, Pahlavi Text p. 480 l. 12. Gujarati Transl. p. 579, Eng. Trans. p. 618. Madon's Ed. Vol. I p. 437 l. 12.

§ Bk. IX Chap. XXXIX, 13; S. B. E. Vol. XXXVII, p. 278. Dastur Darabji Peshotan's Dinkard, Vol. XVIII, Eng. Translation, p. 23. Chap. XXXVII, Pahlavi Text p. 30; Guj. Trans. p. 15. Madon's Edition. Vol. II, p. 857 l. 18.

¶ Chap. VI, 7 S. B. E. Vol. V.

§ (1) The Shayast la shayast, by Dr. M. B. Davar (in the Press)

(2) Shayast-ne shayast. A Pahlavi Text on Religious Customs, by Jehangir C. Tavadia, Hamburg, 1930, p. 97, 1.9 et seq.

** S. B. E. Vol. V, p. 296 n. I.

†† Epistles II, Ch. I 12 Vide Mr. B.N. Dhabhar's Ed. (1912) p. 57 l. 8

innovations, especially in the ritual of Bareshnum. These innovations were not liked by the

people who protested at the headquarters and Manuschihar reprimanded his brother.

JIVANJI JAMSHEDJI MODI

Life and Experiences of a Bengali Chemist. By P. C. RAY (Kegan Paul, London. 7s. 6d.)

Westerners interested in the East have up till recently been inclined to think chiefly in terms of her metaphysical sages. We have been captivated by the potentialities exhibited in her *gurus* and *yogis*. At the same time our admiration has neither been blind nor overwhelming; we have smiled at their flagrant deficiency in living "in this world which is the world of all of us, where we find our happiness or not at all". Not unjustly our idea of the best India can do in the expression of wisdom is symbolised by the *guru* to whom Edward Carpenter once paid a visit. That *guru* was a remarkable man; many things were possible to him which were outside the apparent reach of Carpenter and his fellow Westerners. But his deficiencies were discouraging. His disregard for beauty, his blindness to nature, his contempt for enjoyment of any sort, his dogmatic stupidity when confronted with a few simple modern scientific facts, his deadness, in short, to this world which is lovely and to be loved—made his psychic powers and Olympian indifference appear as inadequate compensations. He represented only half of what humanity has a right to expect and the will to admire. Moreover our personal experience of young Indians in England convinces us that they also are of the same opinion, only more so: that they are less appreciative of and less interested in their *gurus* and *yogis* than we ourselves are. We judge that the youth of India to-day is not going to tread the old path. To-day there are other representatives—men like Gandhi, Tagore, and Sir P. C. Rây. Of Gandhi and Tagore I cannot speak here, save to suggest that neither of them are typical Orientals in the old

sense, and that the two of them taken together give a truly exhilarating idea of what India, perhaps, is about to be.

Sir P. C. Rây, unlike Gandhi and Tagore, is not a literary man and his book, telling of his life and experiences, has grave faults as a book, lacking as it does in planning and literary economy. And it is too modest (he has even omitted to include one single photograph of himself); we see and hear too little of Sir P. C. Rây, and get instead quite an unnecessary amount of Macaulay, Carlyle, Mussolini, Emerson, Benjamin Franklin, Laski, and Herbert Spencer. Nevertheless the faults of the book are not important, for they do not conceal the man. The book unconsciously reveals his wholeness, his common sense, his sensible idealism, his love of India without sentimentality, and his hatred of false knowledge. It is obvious that he exercises a great deal of influence outside, no less than inside, his laboratory. Here, we feel, is the kind of man Young India responds to.

He has given up his life chiefly in the service of Chemistry. His extraordinary success in this line seems to disallow the idea that the East has no head for Science—an idea which his *History of Hindu Chemistry* has done much to dispel. The whole world having recognised and called upon the services of Rây and Bose can hardly continue to regard the East as incapable of Science! But the most significant thing about Sir P. C. Rây is that he established the Bengal Chemical and Pharmaceutical Works, an important and successful industrial enterprise, and yet was ready to join with Gandhi in the Gospel of Charka. As he was more business-like than the business men in the creation of the Works, his attitude towards Spinning and Machinery should command the utmost respect and study. The

injury done to the people of India on behalf of Lancashire (an injury immense and unforgivable and utterly impossible to explain away by any amount of word-wash) is not his only reason for opposing the swift industrialism of India. It is because he is as anxious as Gandhi to save India from the hell of a futile mechanisation. His attitude of realism and idealism here is something with which his younger contemporaries should be proud to associate themselves.

Again, he is a supreme example of the University Man who has been to England, but is absolutely opposed to the mad rush of young Indians to procure degrees. Over against false knowledge, examination-facts, and the prize-winner brain, he displays his deep knowledge of their fatuity. If his influence here is a widespread one India may be saved in the future from the Educationalists—from whose clutches

Europe is only now beginning to escape.

In conclusion I would like to quote certain words in an Address to him from the students of the Presidency College; they will serve to emphasise the remarks above concerning *gurus* and *yogis*.

... Yours was, Sir, no small achievement. Your way of life with its distinct Indian traits, recalled us to the sweet and simple and manly days of Indian attainment. You have been to us all through a guide, philosopher and friend. Easy of access, ever-pleasant, ever-willing to help the poor and needy student with your counsel and your purse, living a life of sturdy, celibate simplicity, with genuine patriotism, not loud but deep, *you have been to us an ancient Guru reborn*, a light and an inspiration from the treasure-house of old Indian spirituality.

It is plain—is it not?—that a *guru* is no longer regarded as one who sits still, but as one who is prepared to take an active part in life, like P. C. Rây in the laboratory and in the field of politics.

J. S. COLLIS

The Chinese Idea of the Second Self. By E. T. C. WERNER (Published by The Shanghai Times, Shanghai.)

A small pamphlet is sometimes worth a multitude of books. Within these fifty pages of clear type Mr. Werner, an authority of long standing on matters Chinese, has compressed a mass of learning of the utmost importance. He guides us through the maze of Chinese cosmological ideas to some very sensible conclusions. Both the students of comparative religion and the philosopher will benefit by his clarity and be thankful for his sense of humour.

The primitive Chinaman, stooping to drink in a pool, caught sight of a second self. Shutting his eyes in sleep he was also conscious of a second self performing various actions. Knowing nothing of reflection or dreams—for such conceptions are beyond primitive man—he endowed, in both cases, this apparition with separate reality. In time he recognised it on other occasions—in his shadow, for instance. In time he gave

it permanent being. The transition period is long and Mr. Werner conducts us through curious byways of eschatological research, showing us how, as time went on, the Chinese elaborated their simple idea of the second self and devised some quite subtle theories concerning it. A *second* self implies a *first* self. What did they think of that? Mr. Werner answers with a kind of diagram “putting Chinese cosmogony in a nutshell”—it is admirably done.

What becomes of the individuality after death? The answer is simple enough. If a man has identified himself with his spiritual self, led a good life according to Confucian precepts, that part of him continues to exist in heaven, and his *yin*, or emotional counterpart, returns to the *yin* of earth and his identification with it ceases. On the other hand, he who has not conformed to the said precepts, loses his *yang*, his spiritual individuality, and retains (until his second death) his *yin*, or perishable emotional individuality.*

* Theosophical students will easily detect their own teachings as expounded in *The Key to Theosophy* by H. P. Blavatsky in these Chinese explanations.—EDS.

Time brings a development in the idea of the second self. “Consciousness,” as we perhaps come to call it, is a differently-conditioned form of the Power manifested throughout the Universe. The energy which drives galaxies of stars at a terrific speed through Space, when it lights up our material brains (which, until then, may be compared to an electric bulb before the current is turned on) is called consciousness. Our second selves are thus affiliated to the Infinite and Eternal Energy from which all things proceed. (p. 43)

Our second self turns out, in impor-

tance, to be our first self and part of Reality Itself. Primitive man was not so far wrong, groping in the dark, and Hope lies ahead.

Therefore all progress grows sacred with wondering expectation. We and the world may go forth from each old year into the new, certain that in that new year there will be for us some novel life, something better than the best experience of life, and better than our conceptions of the immortality we hanker after. And so from life to life, worlds without end. (p. 48)

R. A. L. ARMSTRONG

The Golden Boat. By RABINDRANATH TAGORE. Translated by Bhabani Bhattacharya. (Allen & Unwin, London. 4s. 6d.)

A book by Rabindranath Tagore is like a spirit that leads us by still waters where we may recollect ourselves and regain our integrity. And we need to do this now more than ever, for at no time, perhaps, in any civilised country have the things of the spirit counted for so little as to-day in England and America. The financial crisis that we hear so much about is only one aspect of the general bankruptcy of creeds and systems in our noisily trivial civilization. The Great Powers are proud of their military empires, but in gaining the world they have lost their souls and we, who are their subjects, in the midst of satiety, inwardly starve. Consequently, that of our modern poetry which can be said to have any spiritual significance is eloquent of revolt and despair. In contrast to this state of things, Tagore, with his stillness of spirit and his purity of vision, stands like a saint.

The present book is a collection of poems, fables and sketches covering fifty years of the poet's life. It moves through many moods, in turn gravely philosophical, playful and satirical; but beneath all moods, like a deeper tide, there is a tranquil sense of Being, a constant apprehension of the relation of the Transient and the Eternal, from which is borne a lyricism that invades the mind like a gentle wind bringing

with it an intangible loveliness.

Man has climbed mountains and crossed oceans. He has gone down to the depths of the earth in search of gold. But has he ever known the secret of filling up the void in his soul?

Even between our heart and that of the beloved stretches an infinite void which we attempt to fill with the trifles of day-to-day life. It is this sense of the intangibility of things, of our individual isolation, that give his love lyrics their strange poignance. This and his nearness to the simple and enduring things of nature, the untroubled passing of clouds and the diurnal rotation of darkness and light; his joy in grass and trees and water and all the common language of the universe,—this sets Tagore's work above and beyond the writing of our time or, indeed, of any time, for these things are fundamental to the nature of man in all ages.

In me the life-spark has grown dim under the fumes of thought. So, to see its undarkened flash, I have to turn to the grass, to the tree.

To-day, particularly, we have much to learn from a man who, in the maelstrom of modern life, has retained such a simple steadfastness of vision. His poems should be read slowly over and over till they gradually transform our world. That their beauty is not merely a melody of words is evident from the fact that even in translation they speak to us as soft voices in the heart. Mr. Bhattacharya is to be congratulated on having produced a translation that reads with such natural spontaneity.

PHILIP HENDERSON

The Destiny of Europe. By F. MCEACHRAN. (Faber and Faber, London. 7s. 6d.)

The thesis upheld here is that there exists a definite and distinguishable European tradition upon the recovery of which depends the salvation not only of Europe but of the rest of the world. To defend it successfully it is necessary (1) to define with reasonable clearness the substance of the tradition, (2) to prove that the primary elements of European culture have converged toward its creation, and (3) to show that nothing comparable exists elsewhere. I cannot feel that Mr. McEachran's book adequately meets these requirements.

The tradition he sees maintained in Europe up to a century or so ago is very similar to the humanism associated with Mr. Irving Babbitt and his school: a sort of individualism with the emphasis on self-restraint. The idea is sufficiently vague to need considerable elaboration, the more so because Mr. McEachran refers now and then to religion as something desirable. Yet he nowhere stops to explain what he means by religion and how it is related to the humanism he advocates.

This ambiguity is only deepened by the rapid historical survey of which the book mainly consists. It is argued that the legacies of Greece, Rome and Christianity have coalesced into a single tradition. But is it certain that there is any possibility of coalescence between the ethos, the *Weltanschauung*, of Greece and of Christianity? Again, the individualism implicit in Christianity, has it not taken, as Troeltsch has described them, radically divergent forms? In what sense was Greece individualistic? Did it not, on the contrary, envisage the fusion of the individual with the State—anticipating Jean-Jacques Rousseau—and, at the same time, exclude from humanity a large class of persons on the ground that, as Aristotle said, they were merely "instruments of action," possessions, property? Is Kant's dictum that every man must be

treated as an end in himself really Greek in spirit? How then explain away the statement of A. J. and R. W. Carlyle in their monumental *History of Medieval Political Theory* that the Stoic doctrine of Equality marks the dividing line between the ancient and modern worlds? Mr. McEachran provokes such questions at nearly every point in his argument.

He contends, finally, that there is nothing outside Europe corresponding to this tradition. Now, if I leave aside Russia and the middle West, which may perhaps be only distortions of European culture, it seems to me a little rash to assert that no principles of "unity, multiplicity and moderation," such as Mr. McEachran claims to be the characteristic features of the European type, are to be found in the East. Is restraint restraint, only if clothed in a Greek phrase? Can any culture survive for long—and no one questions the tenacity of the civilisations of India and China—without a regard to these elementary conditions of life? Is Mr. Babbitt utterly wrong in looking upon China as a cradle of humanism? Mr. McEachran thinks that, since the East has adopted industrialism and nationalism, it must also adopt "Plato and Aquinas". But industrialism and nationalism have not so much been adopted as acquiesced in, to escape from the yet more intolerable evil of European imperialism based on economic power. Because Bacon and Rousseau have been reluctantly admitted, why should the Upanishads and the Buddha, Sankara and Confucius, be precipitately thrown out?

Mr. McEachran's aims, I admit, are commendable; he urges the release of the individual from the stifling influence of contemporary mass movements, and seeks for a basis on which the warring nationalities of Europe can be reconciled. But by putting forward a nebulous doctrine and defending it with precarious if not untenable historical generalisations, I fear he alienates even a sympathetic reader.

K. S. SHELIVANKAR

The Great Pyramid in Fact and in Theory. By WILLIAM KINGSLAND, M. I. E. E. Part I. Descriptive. (Rider & Co, London. 30s.)

In view of the unique archaeological importance of the Great Pyramid and the controversies which have been raging round it since the days of Piazzi Smyth, Mr. Kingsland has done a most valuable service to all who are interested in this great monument of the remote past—and who is not?—by giving us a careful, systematic, and unprejudiced account of its design, construction, and dimensions.

Mr. Kingsland, who is a practical engineer, as well as a writer on philosophical and mystical subjects, spent some months in Egypt in 1931, in order to study the Pyramid at first hand and to check the sometimes conflicting observations and measurements of previous explorers. The present volume sets forth the result of his labours, and gives us the most accurate figures obtainable as to the dimensions of the exterior of the Pyramid and of its interior passages and chambers. The book is richly illustrated by an admirably reproduced series of photographs, sketches and plans.

The appearance of this authoritative work is peculiarly timely having regard to the publicity recently given to the claim of Mr. D. Davidson and others of his school that the Great Pyramid was built under the immediate inspiration of Jehovah, by a Pharaoh, who did not understand what he was doing, in order to embody for all time a number of mathematical and other facts and also the orthodox biblical theology of Man's supposed Fall and Redemption—to play the part, indeed, of a supplement to the divine revelation alleged to be contained in the Jewish scriptures. That the builders of the Pyramid did possess a profound knowledge of geometry, mathematics, astronomy, and architecture, together with a highly developed technical skill, is proved by the character of the building itself; but Mr. Kingsland demonstrates that many of the more extravagant claims of the Biblical

Pyramidists are founded on inexact measurements and may therefore be dismissed as baseless. He shows, moreover, that the so-called "Sacred," or "Pyramid" cubit of 25.025 British inches, invented by Piazzi Smyth, has no existence in the actual measurements of the structure; but that the unit of length used by the builders was the Egyptian cubit of 20.612 British inches.

Although one of many superficially similar monuments, the Great Pyramid is unique in size, proportions, and structural details. Compared with it, the stonework of the Second and Third Pyramids—its nearest congeners—is rough and inferior. Their purpose was evidently to cover the tombs of their founders, which were cut into the rock on which they stand. In neither of them have there been discovered any interior passages in the masonry itself; whereas in the Great Pyramid—rightly or wrongly attributed to Khufu, the second king of the fourth dynasty—the complex and mysterious system of passages and chambers is one of its most inexplicable features.

The problems in connection with the meaning and purpose of the Great Pyramid are no harder to solve than the question of *how* it was built. How did men, at that stage of civilisation, manage to quarry, transport over long distances, cut to shape with the utmost accuracy, and finally place in position, the enormous stones which formed the external casing of the Pyramid; and how, in particular, were the gigantic granite roof beams of the King's Chamber—the largest of them weighing about 73 tons—raised into position 160 feet above the foundation level? And yet, we are told, "there is no record in Egypt itself of any gradual development of architectural knowledge and skill." Mr. Kingsland may well ask:—

How did the exquisite technical knowledge and skill displayed in this vast structure suddenly make its appearance? Though the Great Pyramid is *in* Egypt, is it *of* Egypt?

The present volume constitutes Part I of Mr. Kingsland's work, and we shall look forward with the keenest

interest to the publication of Part II, in which he promises to deal with the theoretical side of the problem of the Pyramid, and to endeavour to answer the question :—

Are the admitted facts sufficient on which to base any consistent theory whatsoever of this magnificently enigmatical structure, every detail of which is a problem?

R. A. V. M.

Tolstoi: Zyn Wezen en zyn Werk, Tolstoi: The Man and His Work. By Mrs. Roland Holst. (W. L. and J. BRUSSE, Rotterdam.)

Students of the writings of H. P. Blavatsky will remember with what respect she refers to Tolstoi and his views; how in *The Key to Theosophy* she cites him as one who tried to carry out the noble precepts of the Christ literally; how in one place she quotes at length from a lecture of his on "Life," introducing the passage by inviting her readers to see for themselves "how near his views are to the esoteric and philosophical teachings" of higher Theosophy; and how she speaks of his effort to tread the Aryan Path as "the real escape he made beyond the delusions in which most of us live".

Tolstoi's struggle to effect this escape, and his achievement, are described in detail in this book. Unlike most of his admirers, the author of the present work sees Tolstoi's life as a unity. To most students the contrast between the first half of his life and the second is so strong, that they find it impossible to see any vital connection between the two. To Mrs. Roland Holst the unifying element is obvious. It is to be found, she tells us, in an ever-present urge to self-realization. In most of us this urge is soon exhausted—an easily extinguished spark; but in Tolstoi it burned his long life through, like a glowing fire, energizing him to continued effort to express that which was most real to him at any given time. His "self" was full of contrasts, his ideals altered and expanded, grew as his varied experience of life matured the capacities of his powerful mind and soul. Hence the apparently irreconcilable phases of his character

and work. It is from this soul-standpoint, then, that the author delineates Tolstoi's character and tells of the vicissitudes of his outer life, his development and second birth, and finally his struggle for spiritual mastery of himself. And then she asks: What is Tolstoi's significance for our own times? Are his views on ethical and social questions still of practical value for us to-day? Can they help us now in our present efforts to bring about a spiritual renaissance in social life? The writer's answer is an emphatic affirmative, substantiated by a careful analysis of the principles for which Tolstoi stands and their connection with the present situation. Her general conclusion would seem to be that Tolstoi's message is the very one needed at the present juncture.

Mrs. Holst has herself passed through many phases. A socialist of many years' standing, she was for a long time a confirmed adherent of the more materialistic forms of this view of life. But recently she has become aware of forces at work in human life, which she previously knew not of. She has come to believe in Socialism of a new kind. Her present attitude she has summed up in a work of more recent date than the one under review :—

Perhaps the times are ripe for a Socialism rooted, not in the interests of a group, but in the welfare of all; which knows no enemies, only fellow sharers of the common lot, fellow victims of a tendency the West has been manifesting continuously for many ages—a tendency to wander away from the original source of things.

Did not Tolstoi strive to realize just such an ideal as is implied in these words?

A. DE L.

The Romance of the Inward Light. By L. V. HOLDSWORTH. (J. M. Dent and Sons, London. 7s. 6d.)

When George Fox set out in the middle of the seventeenth century to be the apostle of a new reformation, his conception of a direct inward illumination from God within every man's inner being was largely experimental. True, the use of the word Light came from the Gospel of John—"the Light that lighteth every man that cometh into the world"—and the inward power of salvation described by the mystic Jacob Boehme was an example which may well have come before Fox's notice. But it was from no outward source, Eastern or Occidental, that Fox's sense of revealed truth, of apprehension by a stronger, higher power than himself, was derived. It came from personal, mystical experiences—"openings," as he called them. And it was this sense of personal guidance by an inward illumination that was the spiritual force behind seventeenth century Quakerism.

The faith of Friends spread in those days of fervour like a flame. Persecutions, vile imprisonments, and virulent attacks only seemed to nourish the spiritual power of the Quakers. And it is the romance which lies behind the stories of these fervid apostles of light, the sufferings which they endured for truth's sake, and the reality of their sense of guidance, which form the theme of this volume. Written from an imaginative point of view in the style of the author's previous work, *A Book of Quaker Saints*, the thread of the lesson of the Inward Light runs throughout. And although no other unity is apparent (some of the sections being loosely historical, some imaginatively biographical, and some frankly fictional episodes with a small basis of fact), yet it affords many vivid descriptions of stirring days and many sympathetic pictures of such striking characters as Fox, his wife Margaret Fell, and Elizabeth Hooton, the first Quaker woman

preacher.

If there is a fault in the telling, it is that the sense of hero-worship, especially as regards Fox, is at times somewhat oppressive. As Rufus Jones admits "Fox no doubt overstressed the range and scope of inward guidance." He was something more than a man with strange, piercing eyes and a mysterious power over all who met him. And his violent opposition to the priests and their "steeple-houses" was not altogether sound.

But Mrs. Holdsworth does show the founder of the Society of Friends as a rich and complex nature, even if she slurs over a few of his weaknesses. She shows that he was far more than a fanatic with an *idée fixe*, and that as he himself says, "I had a sense of all conditions," so that he could mix with anyone, from the Lord Protector to the humble farmer's handyman, and feel their needs. She sees Fox as the Seeker after Reality, the man who, when appealed to to fight for the Commonwealth against a tyrant king (a cause he must have sympathised with much) replied that he lived in the virtue of that power and life which took away the occasion of all wars. The higher way was always the choice of Fox and his companions. And the ancient Quaker "plain language" and refusal to do "hat-honour" were simply the results of carrying the determination to "publish Truth" into profitless channels.

The early Quakers, in fact, never shrank from the practical application of the truths which they believed had been revealed to them experimentally—whether it meant loss, imprisonment, floggings or even death. Such records as *A Book of Quaker Saints* and *The Romance of the Inward Light*, even if rather highly tinged with the imagination for some, are for that reason an inspiration in these days when men are not used to suffer for their beliefs or to endure material loss for a non-material truth.

G. W. WHITEMAN

CORRESPONDENCE

FROM PARIS

EVOLUTION OF PUBLIC OPINION

[J. B. endeavours this quarter to give us the real French view on War and other problems, in contrast to the official or journalistic outlook.—EDS.]

Quite hackneyed, no doubt, is the comparison one could draw between France and China: both countries blessed with—or labouring under—an ancient civilization; both creative, yet leaving the rest of the world to develop and mature their own inventions; both essentially agricultural, with all the implications of a peace-loving and conservative spirit; both rather too often subject to invasions and civil wars; both the laughing-stock of younger countries for their thriftiness (or avariciousness)—not to mention a host of other features they possess in common. And just as China was, until quite recently, supposed to remain petrified in her ancient ideas, customs, and prejudices, it may be that French public opinion appears to outsiders as immovably fixed on its pre-war positions—which is very far indeed from being true. For what we all know of foreign countries and foreign politics is mostly based on what our newspapers say, and the latter's sources of information are Governmental doings and—news-papers again. Now I wonder if there is a country where both the Government and the Press reflect public opinion less accurately than

they do in France. Between them there is a chasm which is growing steadily and unaccountably wider.

When a boy, I was rather shocked to find in one of George Meredith's earlier novels the French incidentally described as a war-like nation. Nowadays I realize that up to 1914 their attitude in this respect was not quite worthy of their ripe culture. The older generation, which had witnessed the defeat of 1870, seemed to consider war as a not quite unhappy event, provided it should end in victory. It was generally regarded as a normal possibility, something that could not be averted and therefore was not worth worrying about.

Following on the excitement of the Dreyfus affair, which was really the case of sincerity *versus* authority, the struggle of liberty against tradition—a conflict which we should have thought could never be quenched—the first few years of this century seemed flat and dull. What strangely remote, mysterious entities foreign nations seemed to be in those days! America or Spain, Britain or Russia, were like puppets on a stage; the one might be the hero, the other the villain, but we never ex-

pected to meet them face to face in real life or to see our fate intermingled with theirs. Colonies we already possessed on the map, but not in our national consciousness; they were an unpleasant subject, suggestive of uncouth names, malaria, violence and bloodshed.

Then about 1908 or 1910 things seemed to brighten up a little. New tendencies were, one by one, finding expression; quite in a small way, perhaps, yet proving that we need not for ever remain in the same groove. As an instance take Romain Rolland's novel, *Jean Christophe*, which answered exactly to the hankering of the younger generation after German culture and German friendship. But what this meant to us will probably remain incomprehensible to readers who have not known the French of the 1870 generation and their bogies called "Prussia," "Bismarck," and so forth. One could at last breathe an exhilarating atmosphere of anarchy and scepticism. The time-honoured idols—religious, political, artistic—were going to be thrown into a bonfire. . . .

Then some unpleasant Franco-German incidents occurred. Very few people knew that our case in Morocco was not a completely sound one, and the whole nation was caused to believe that Germany was deliberately seeking a quarrel—precisely what an old French idiom calls "*une querelle d'Allemand*". An intelligent man succeeded in averting the peril of war, and was called a traitor and

a scoundrel for his pains. Another statesman, quite narrow-minded, but who has never been suspected of bribery, came into power, and there was a sudden change in the atmosphere. He had never concealed his desire of recovering his native Lorraine, and though the younger men felt in no wise concerned with that old grievance, they allowed themselves to be unconsciously fanned into a state of irritation against Germany. It was then quite easy for him, when the time came in 1914, to give the whole machinery a stealthy flip, and everything toppled over on the side of war.

All this we began to understand only ten or fifteen years later. We cannot now explain, or excuse, our collective war-time blindness—except that it was exactly the same in all the other countries. Romain Rolland's aloofness, for instance—he went to live in Switzerland—was universally criticized, even in the most liberal circles. Some men did feel uncomfortable because German and neutral papers were not allowed in France, and the more reflective minds were alarmed by the humbug of inter-allied politics. Anyway, they could not protest. Thus passed five weary years in the midst of material suffering, dire bereavements and fear of the future.

Fear, indeed, has been weighing on us unceasingly for the last twenty years. Fear is the explanation of all the events in French politics at home and abroad. After the fear of the German in-

vasion, we had the fear of bolshevism, and, as people will always vote *against* something, not *for* something, the first general elections after the war returned a strong Conservative majority. The same army was kept up as before 1914, though the need for it was no longer apparent. The occupation of the Rühr district which made France so unpopular in the whole world was deeply resented by the French themselves, so the next elections (1924) turned against M. Poincaré's policy. But financial troubles and a carefully put-up panic enabled his party to call him to power again in 1926, for, as André Siegfried wittily remarked, "the average Frenchman carries his heart on the Left, but his purse on the Right"!

Meanwhile certain documents and books were being published, for instance, Fabre-Luce's *La Victoire*, and also the note-book of the late George Louis, who had been our Ambassador in Petersburg until M. Poincaré removed him; more recently Demartial's and René Gérin's bold and outspoken books; also several war and post-war novels were being translated from the German, and by degrees an ever-growing section of the French Public realised that we had been thoroughly hoodwinked. The desire for peace is now all the deeper in this country because people understand that war is never the spontaneous onslaught of a bloodthirsty nation, but is artfully prepared and brought about by the will of a few men.

Yet before we had time to settle down to peace, new causes for apprehension had arisen. Our next-door neighbours are all brandishing their swords. A people that we have always loved and that we are not conscious of having ever wronged is being systematically taught to hate us. Its schoolboys are drilled in the use of rifles and machine-guns, and the *Duce* holds out as a reward the joyful expectation of firing them on us one of these days. "Empty words," some may say; but on the shores of the Mediterranean, rhetoric is equivalent to might, and speech is readily transformed into action. Millions of Germans give their allegiance to another Dictator who also calls vengeance on the French, and whose hold on the crowds seems to be but an appeal to the silliest passions. The mysterious land of the Soviets is said to be accumulating an enormous military strength. Japan imitates but too well the felonies of European nations, and so on, and so on. Thus movements towards international goodwill are paralysed, and, in fairness to what one may call the devotees of militarism in France, it must be allowed that they have good reasons for alarm. Some people, even here, believe that complete and unconditional disarmament is the only way to peace, but they are as yet few, and powerless. The socialist party has made disarmament a catchword only on the understanding that it will never be carried out. In a State-ridden

country like this, hundreds of thousands of small people, who thrive more or less directly on the army, the navy, the gun manufactories, etc., would lose their living. They can hardly be called militarists, because the regiment, the submarines, the aeroplanes or the powder factory are to them like pet cows, never to be thought of as instruments of war. They are too ignorant of modern history to realise that even a defensive war is carefully avoided when the stocks of ammunition are felt to be rather short.

A constantly recurring phrase in the official utterances of our statesmen is that treaties must on no account be touched. I have never met any Frenchman in flesh and blood who was prepared to support this opinion. They realise all too well the imperfections and absurdities of the Treaty of Versailles; surely it would have been revised by now if the Germans had honestly desired it. It is not felt that they ever did, or else they were very tactless. It has ever been the unlucky fate of Franco-German dealings that everything happens à *contre-temps*; any amenable disposition on the one side is sure to meet with a rebuff on the other. Generally speaking the French consider the Germans are difficult and discouraging partners, who have hardly played the game. No doubt the Germans think exactly the same of us. Preventing the *Anschluss*, the unification of two countries who have exactly the same culture, language, interests,

etc., is also generally felt to be a hopeless and nefarious job. A smaller section of the French "intelligentsia" regret the alliances with several new States in central Europe, doubting if they can conduce to the preservation of peace.

I have tried to give an unbiased, though very incomplete account of French opinion regarding international affairs. I have left out all our extremists on the nationalist as well as on the pacifist side. After all it is of some significance that not even the most rabid French patriot would venture to say, like his compeers in other countries, that he believes in war.

Of all our problems and fears of the last twenty years, nothing has been solved, removed, or become a "bygone". And now France, as well as other countries, must in her turn face the problem of unemployment, with its terrible consequences. But nothing perhaps, is more distressing to those Frenchmen who are now middle-aged than to witness the indifference of younger men to the possession of political liberty. Of all the conquests and ideals of the nineteenth century, we thought it was perhaps the only one that had been worth dying for. Yet not only do we see our neighbours deliberately renouncing this hard-won privilege, but even at home the younger generations are ready to throw themselves into the hands of any despotic power; the greater part of the *bourgeoisie* and the aristocracy of money would naturally prefer an autocrat on

the Italian pattern; while those who possess nothing, and also a great many "intellectuals," are turning towards communism, which can at least boast of remarkable constructive qualities. The glaring incapacity of the Republican State to deal with present problems makes it probable that a revolution must break out sooner or later. Which of those two directions it will take seems at present quite impossible to foretell.

J. B.

SHAKESPEARE THROUGH EASTERN EYES

The review of Dr. Ranjee G. Shahani's *Shakespeare Through Eastern Eyes* in your February ARYAN PATH mentions, among other high qualities of the author, "a wide knowledge". Any non-Indian reviewer, unacquainted with the actual state of affairs in India, cannot be blamed for such an assumption; for he would naturally take for granted that the "facts" and citations given in the book must be unimpeachable. But any one who has seen Shakespeare acted in the vernaculars in India, and knows at first hand something of the literatures drawn upon by Dr. Shahani, cannot but feel that the author has evidently no first hand information about plays and scenes which he describes as if they were still standing before his mind's eye. In fact, Dr. Shahani is hopelessly at sea when he talks of the Gujarati, Marathi and Urdu stage versions of Shakespeare's plays. And he is no less at sea when he brings forward every now and then "Eastern standards" and "Oriental canons" of literary criticism as trump cards in order to score off Shakespeare. On p. 70 he gives himself away when he speaks of "faring forth in a literary punt for the demolition of all ducks, swans (of Avon or elsewhere) or even geese". But my present purpose is to show that the facts, the very premises on which Dr. Shahani bases his "thesis," are utterly wrong.

We shall put aside the "interlude" of the "young Indian gentleman freshly returned from England," who reads *La Vie Parisienne* and *Candide* at dinner,

—a periodical and a book quite outside the ambit of our Indian playwrights. Let us examine the concrete "facts" marshalled by Dr. Shahani in the very short chapter entitled "Interval". At the outset we are given what reads like a personal reminiscence of a performance of "Hamlet" in what our author persistently but wrongly calls the "Marahti" language. We are informed that the play has "undergone a strange transformation,"—it ends happily, for "we see Hamlet majestically strutting towards the vacant throne . . . with the fair Ophelia,—or, rather, Kamlata, on his arm." (p. 60) Now the only Marathi version of "Hamlet" that has been popular on the stage is a careful and close translation by the late Professor Agarkar; it does not end happily; both Hamlet and Ophelia die in it as in the original; and "Kamlata" is certainly not the Indian name given in it to Ophelia,—it is "Mallikā". What has the Doctor seen?

Only two pages later we are startled to read that the same "Kamlata stands for *Desdemona*" in a "very popular musical version of 'Othello' in Gujarati"! On p. 63 our guide veers again from Gujarati to Marathi and informs us that "the Marahta even likes his Shakespeare turned *sangit*—made musical." The Shakespearian plays that have been popular on the Marathi stage were *not* "Sangit"; it was the special distinction of the company that staged them that it eschewed all music. On p. 64 Dr. Shahani tells us that "The

Winter's Tale' has figured on the Urdu stage in a strange metamorphosis." And his authority for this is a Professor's "dim recollection of having seen it acted in Urdu,"—"information" which our author modestly regrets he is "unable to supplement"! The Urdu version of "The Winter's Tale" called "Murid-e-Shak" was one of the Shakespearian successes of an eminent actor-manager, the late K. P. Khatau, and it was a fairly close version of the original, as were his still more successful stage versions of "Hamlet" ["Khūn-e-Nāhaq"] and "Romeo and Juliet" ["Bazm-e-Fāni"]. On p. 65 we are told about the successful Marathi version of "Hamlet" that "neither the title, names nor characters have been changed". This is the version by Agarkar, mentioned above, of which the title is "Vikāra Vilasita," and in which the names of all the characters are Indianised. On the same page our historian says that "The Winter's Tale' was turned into Marahti by one Mahajani, under the name of 'Vitor Vilsit' ". Let us assume that the impossible "Vitor" is a misprint for "Vikar". But, as said above, "Vikāra Vilasita" is the name of Agarkar's version of "Hamlet,"—a version that is prescribed to-day for the M. A. examination in Marathi by the Bombay University. Finally, on p. 67, Dr. Shahani writes:

"Macbeth" never seems to have appeared on the Gujarati or Marahti stage, and I am not aware that it has been translated into these vernaculars. Lady Macbeth is utterly unacceptable to an Indian audience.

As a matter of fact, "Mānājirāo" is the name of a very well-known and very close Marathi version of "Macbeth" by the late Professor S. M. Paranjpe; it exists in book form; it was quite a success on the Marathi stage; and, Dr. Shahani's theorising notwithstanding, it was exactly Lady Macbeth's part that made the play not only "acceptable" but quite a stage success.

So much for Dr. Shahani's "facts," and his knowledge of the vernacular versions of Shakespeare in this Presidency. Let us now turn to his interesting theories of literary criticism. Un-

fortunately, though Dr. Shahani talks a lot about "Eastern standards," "Oriental principles of literary criticism" and "Eastern canons of judgment," the nearest approach he makes to these "standards" and "principles" and "canons" is to quote the dicta of the well-known Vedantist, Swami Vivekānanda, and of two or three not well-known Professors; and similarly, although Dr. Shahani makes a sweeping mention of "the entire literature of India" (p. 142), the nearest acquaintance he betrays with Oriental literature is by way of well-known translations or vague generalizations on them by persons who are not known to be Orientalists of any repute. For instance, Dr. Shahani tells us on p. 120 that "religion is so vital a matter with the Oriental . . . that it becomes the very basis of his literary criticism"; and, again, on p. 142 that "the entire literature of India is steeped" in "religious mysticism". And what is his authority for saying so? Swami Vivekānanda's nebulous dictum that "Art is Brahma"! Well, for the matter of that, everything, including our Doctor's thesis, is Brahma—or Māyā. But any one who knows the definitions of "Kāvya," poetry, given by the most eminent Sanskrit writers on poetics—Dandin, Mammāṭa, Vishvanātha, Jagannāth—need not be told that they all lay stress on the æsthetic appeal as the real differentia of "Kāvya". Similarly, any one who has even a casual acquaintance with the whole range of "classical" Sanskrit literature, of which Kālidāsa is believed to be the highest peak, should know that this literature is quite innocent of "religious mysticism". In fact the intellectual and spiritual atmosphere of this mass of literature is so crystal clear, the beliefs and ideas of the writers are so clearly defined and systematized, that mysticism is the last thing one should expect to find in their works. Dr. Shahani, stalking behind "the Indian"—in order to "demolish" all "ducks, swans (of Avon or elsewhere) or even geese"—complains that "no character in Shakespeare contemplates transcendental problems and essays to give a satisfactory

answer to them." Which character in Kālidāsa, or Śūdraka, or Bhavabhūti, or Harsha, performs this feat? Is a stage play the place for discussing "transcendental problems"? And yet the learned Doctor gravely compares "Hamlet" with the *Gita* and meanders through three or four pages to establish the superiority of chalk over cheese.

Is it that a pardonable ambition to "demolish" Shakespeare and thus appear original, combined with an unpardonable ignorance of the material he so recklessly handles, has led Dr. Shahani to pass off the cobwebs of three or four persons as the general verdict of educated India? I cannot speak for the

whole of India, but I can for at least the Bombay Presidency *minus* the backward desert of Sind; and I know that the young literary lions of Gujarat and Maharashtra do not think or write as Dr. Shahani would have us believe they do. The Doctor has every right to believe and say that Shakespeare was a third-rate poet, or that the solitary Sindhi classic, "Shāhjo Risālo," is far superior to anything Shakespeare ever wrote. But he has no right to pass off his own or his coterie's crotchets as the considered judgment of all educated Indians.

Bombay

J. S.

THE ORIGIN OF INDIAN CASTES

The origin of the four Indian castes, still appears shrouded in mystery to seekers of Truth. Hypotheses and conjectures have their value in science and also in the reconstruction of lost history. They may serve to stimulate and direct thought, guide and enlighten enquiry. But oftener than not they have proved false guides leading into a morass of confusions.

The late Mr. Charles Johnston's hypothesis about the origin of Indian castes and religions to which a correspondent in THE ARYAN PATH of January draws attention is suggestive within certain limits of both validity and applicability. We may say this without raising the issue whether the position may or may not be "heterodox" to scholars. Considering the insufficiency and inadequacy of the data now available to scholars for making any kind of dependable deductions in matters lying in the dim borderland of history, one should feel extremely nervous in making any assertion whatever as to what may be or may not be orthodox to scholars as regards such matters. The colour and physical structure of the races of mankind, the fundamentals of religious and social consciousness and institutions, the essentials of the ritual and

art-expression of beliefs and emotions—are so old and so deep-laid that we can hardly expect to be able to get down to their beginnings. Archaeology has long held fast to the orthodoxy of her Old Stone, New Stone and Metal Ages. There are facts justifying such classification. But do these facts justify any inference, positive or negative, as to the *value* of the human cultures connected with these ages? Does the use of stone implements, in the absence of any other conclusive evidence, prove the primitiveness of barbarism to the hilt? Does the practice of the cult of Magic prove it? A culture proud of its mechanistic achievement and glorying in the complexity of its life may fail to appreciate the rude simplicity of the stone implement; and a science blinded by its own matter-madness may deride the ancient magic cult of barbaric peoples. But nothing is proved as to the value of "primitive" cultures by this want of appreciation and understanding. And this want of understanding has been common but not universal among enquirers.

Divergent opinions were held and are still held as to the values and historical probabilities of the immemorial human complex. That complex is twofold—a

complex of race and a complex of culture. Under the first we may note complex of colour and of other physical features; under the second, complex of belief, art and ritual, and of dialect. Now this whole manifold of ancient human complex is a fact which has to be admitted as a first premise of any process of historical deduction or interpretation relating to the remote past. There may have been many theories of all kinds as to the origin and development of the human complex, but it would be wrong to claim that any position has ever been held among competent and conscientious investigators that might be called "official" or "orthodox". There has never been, in matters of guessing and theorizing, a generally agreed position in modern scholarship. Views and surmises have not tended to converge to a focus. Any new or old suggestive idea as to the mystery of human origins is welcome. It need not be afraid of any official ban or challenge of orthodoxy.

Even within the range of recorded history, where greater light can be brought to bear upon any uncertain or disputed position, scholastic orthodoxy seems to be less assertive and less imperative to-day than it was yesterday. One entrenched position after another has been blown up by the explosive mine of new facts or affinities discovered. The discovery of the Indus Civilisation has proved such a mine of explosion in Indian history. It is now agreed that we possess actual evidence of a pre-Aryan and pre-Vedic civilisation in India. But whilst agreement exists as to the great age of the Indus Civilisation, are competent scholars agreed as to the prefix *pre* or *post* which some would so lavishly attach to Aryan, Dravidian, and so forth? Now, though opinions are and have been held about these, one can hardly claim that opinions have converged or are tending to converge to a focus of simplified solution in regard to these problems. There is no official ban of any kind for new or old theories essaying to make a fresh survey of the entire field of facts and

prepare a fresh résumé of them.

So the late Mr. Johnston's theory is not called upon to submit to any official test of scholastic orthodoxy. Conscientious scholars must for the present be content to plead *ignorance* as to the riddle of Indian castes and religions. At any rate, they must defer judgment and wait for more light. A suggestion like Mr. Johnston's cannot be to them anathema. No; but a suggestion like this, to be valid and to be applicable, must submit to another kind of test. That test—the logical test of any hypothesis—has a positive and a negative aspect.

First, is this theory adequate and sufficient as a résumé of the relevant facts of the Indian ensemble of castes and religions? In other words, does it tally with them? Second, putting this theory aside, is it not possible to marshal and explain those facts in a more satisfactory way by a different supposition?

Before putting it to this test we have ruled out for reasons given above the preliminary objection that might be taken on the side of modern scholarship. Now, Mr. Johnston's theory does not quite pass either of the tests. It is quite right when it lays the roots of the four castes deeper than mere social economy, convenience and convention. The distinctions were possibly fundamental. But not in the sense and to the extent contemplated by this theory. It was not the case of *ab initio* divergent races of different colours etc., coming to conflict and ultimately fuse with one another. It was not the mechanical or chemical combination of diverse elements giving a compound. It was rather like an organic growth in which a nucleus of living matter radiates into divergent lines of energy and evolves into a variety of organs and functions. We start with unity and end with unity in multiplicity or organic unity. The origin of the four castes as contemplated in the famous Purush Sūkta of the *Rik* and *Atharva* Vedas is of the nature of this organic evolution—the four castes evolve from the four limbs of the supreme Purusha. The Mahabharata,

again, while speaking of the four colours of the four castes, says that the colours are all differentiated from a primary colour. In fact, "colour" in ancient mystical literature is primarily a dynamic spiritual entity having its manifestation in *guna* and *karma*—that is, a certain arrangement of springs of action and behaviour resulting therefrom. The physical colour—red, white and so on—is an accident, sometimes even a separable accident, of the physical expression of the dynamic entity which is the Seed of race or of caste. It is the dynamic entity of the proton and electron that constitutes the "caste" of an atom of matter and assigns its place in the realm of *properties* and *functions*. Fundamentally, the dynamic entity is, like the Idea of Plato or *élan vital* of Henry Bergson, creative, shaping and informing its own appropriate vehicle and instrument in the planes of mind, life and matter. It works at and through the nucleus of mind, life and matter stuff. It works out differentiations not only in the human race, but all through Nature, animate or inanimate. In the human species we recognise the four types which, dynamically speaking, are the four varnas. The four colours have an esoteric but not necessarily a physical nexus with the four varnas. White for instance is the esoteric colour of Brāhmaṇa Sattva—the true and pure Varna. When the *Gita* says that the four Varnas have been organised by the Divine Being Himself, in accordance with "moments" of character and conduct, what is really meant is this primordial differentiation of the four fundamental and universal types of modes of being and functioning. Hindu scriptures arrange plants and animals and even stocks and stones according to these radical types. It is a Cosmic Pattern.

This, in brief, was and has been the "orthodox" theory of varnas in India. As we saw, modern historical research has nothing to say for or against it, just as modern science has nothing to say for or against a résumé of the universe on the lines of idealism. Modern research not daring to challenge or veto it, this

view of the origin of castes and cultures should be found to be more in consonance with the deeper "intuitions" of philosophy and science, and more agreeable to the facts of Indian race evolution, than any other hypothesis including that of Mr. Johnston.

Whether the Aryans came from outside or not, they came and lived as a race complex and as a culture complex from the very beginning; the Varnas or Seeds of Caste in the fundamental sense above explained were there. They could not but be there. In the Vedic ensemble of conditions the seeds themselves can no doubt be traced. But in actual manifestation neither organic unity nor plasticity nor even transmutability of the "limbs" was yet lost. Whether in actual manifestation the four seed types had as yet expressed themselves into four different colours, anatomies and cultures is an issue which the historian or the ethnologist has no means of deciding at present. It may be noted however that the Seed or *Bija* is a deep-acting dynamic entity which in course of time will tend to evolve striking changes in physical and other characters. The Idea will naturally fashion its own appropriate vehicle. Its action is profounder than that of the secretions of the thyroid and other glands now admitted by all physiologists. Hence one should expect certain differentiations of physical and other characters after the varna principles have for some time been in operation. We need not here discuss the question of promiscuous mixing of the four pure castes and resultant confusion (*sanghara*) to which the *Gita* also refers.

Each Type has like a rotating top its axis of rotating equilibrium. It can correct oscillations from that axis and readjust itself within certain limits. When those limits are exceeded it topples over. Now, in India, the Aryan race complex must have come in contact with other race complexes, black or yellow. There must have been resulting oscillations or variations from the Aryan axis. The Aryan race and culture

complex both underwent change. One thing seems certain—the growth and evolution of the Aryan complex in India have proceeded more from causes acting latently and from within, than from causes acting from outside. The process has been more central than peripheral, more of the nature of evolution by unfolding than of the nature of evolution by accretion and epigenesis. Mr. Johnston's theory seems to have laid its emphasis on the wrong place.

On the culture side also it is wrong to construct any watertight compartments and hold that such and such beliefs were the exclusive possessions and contributions of the white, red, yellow or black peoples. A mechanistic way of thinking will be of no good. Science is no monopoly of any particular race or colour. Neither was Ancient Culture or *Vidya* the monopoly of any particular group of men. The Aryan light and the Aryan Path dis-

closed themselves and still continue to disclose themselves to the appropriate Vehicle whenever and wherever that happens to exist. It is true that some aspects of ancient Brahmanic (e.g. Panchāgnividya) revealed themselves first to Kshatriya kings, and were afterwards communicated to Brahmanas. But the Upanishads do not say or show that Brahma Vidya as such was in the exclusive possession of any one colour. The Vedas, too, unmistakably show that they contain the germs at least of all those ideas and beliefs that Mr. Johnston's theory would call future accretions or acquisitions. The *Rik-Veda*, for example, is not a simple picture of primitive nature-worship and ancestor-worship. Mr. Johnston's theory has pulverized the organic unity of Aryan race and culture evolution.

PRAMATHANATH MUKHOPADHYAYA
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सत्यं दानं क्षमा शीलमानुशंस्यं तपो वृणा ।
दृश्यन्ते यत्र नागेन्द्र स ब्राह्मण इति स्मृतः ॥
शूद्रे तु यद्भवेत्क्षयं द्विजे तच्च न विद्यते ।
नैव शूद्रो भवेच्छूद्रो ब्राह्मणो न च ब्राह्मणः ॥

—महाभारतेषु वनपर्वे.

Truth, charity, forgiveness, good conduct, gentleness, austerity, and mercy, where these are seen, O King of the Serpents, there is a Brahmana. If these marks exist in a Shudra and are not in a Dvija, the Shudra is not a Shudra nor the Brahmana a Brahmana.

—MAHABHARATA, VANAPARVA,

"———ends of verse
And sayings of philosophers."

HUDIBRAS.

A very weird and most interesting sketch, entitled "Mortimer's Ghost," is contributed by Mr. A. N. Monkhouse to the *Manchester Guardian Weekly* (Feb. 10th). In it is shown clearly the dual nature of man, spiritual and devilish. Mortimer confides to a friend that he feels his mind is being "monkeyed with" by some outside agency. Villainous and cruel suggestions are injected into it. His friend, though wishing to help, and realizing Mortimer's genuine distress, can do nothing. Some evenings later he calls on Mortimer, and asks "How is the ghost?" The reply showed that Mortimer suspected his friend of being the undesirable outside agency. "I won't have it," he said, "I shall buy a revolver. I'll shoot any man that tries to take possession of my mind. No, I don't know it's you—not yet." After some conversation Mortimer was soothed down, and parted with his friend almost genially. "I'm my own ghost; that's the idea?"—were his parting words. But he bought a revolver the next day, and shot himself. One is left with the idea that he had discovered that it was no outside agency but in reality himself who was the "ghost".

Every one has these two sides

to his nature but fortunately in the great majority the devilish side is not so prominent. Stevenson in *Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde* gave an extreme case; so did Lord Lytton in *Zanoni*; so does Mr. Monkhouse in *Mortimer's Ghost*.

Lord Lytton describes how the neophyte Glyndon deliberately disobeys the commands of his occult teacher and by his own act brings himself face to face with "a ghostly and remorseless foe," a phantom of evil raised by himself and only to be conquered by himself. This "Dweller on the Threshold" was the personification of his "unholy desires and criminal designs," ever to be in attendance on him until he by a pure and good life was able to resist its appalling influence. This "Dweller" is surely within us all, but quiescent. The imagination of certain writers, however, has pictured its awakening in the soul so strong in evil as to be disabled from conquering the black shadow—which too is a fact in Occultism.

Such devilishness—the evil heirloom of past lives—cannot be explained without some Theosophical knowledge. Mme. Blavatsky tells us that although spirituality should be at our present stage on an ascending arc, yet

the selfishness of the *personality* has

so strongly infected the real *inner* man with its lethal *virus*, that the upward attraction has lost all its power on the thinking reasonable man. In sober truth, vice and wickedness are an *abnormal*, unnatural manifestation, at this period of our human evolution—at least they ought to be so. (*The Secret Doctrine* II, 110)

What, then, is the cause of this abnormality? The root cause is that mankind does not live naturally, and therefore attracts to itself the evil influences of past generations.

Where are they stored? How do they emanate? Theosophy teaches of a certain subtle essence or atmosphere which encircles our globe, and which is visible only to the clairvoyant eye. It absorbs into itself, like a sponge, all the evil influences which a man generates, at the same time darting forth the evil influences gathered in the past. This atmosphere is known as the Astral Light. Eliphas Lévi, the learned Kabbalist, termed it the "Great Serpent". This "Great Serpent" affects humanity as a whole, and individually as an individual responds to it. Those "in whom there is no guile" will not be touched, but they are few in number. The vast majority are affected to a smaller or a greater degree, each according to his power to resist the evil. But there are certain individuals in whom lie hidden, unknown to themselves, seeds of very evil potentiality, and these seeds the "astral light" matures. Such are the sanctimonious Jekylls who turn to wrathful

Hydes, the Glyndons full of ambitions and doubts who pry into the secrets of others, and the self-harassed Mortimers who shoot themselves. Having sown within themselves seeds of conscious evil, they must either tear them up from the soil or reap the harvest.

Just as solar rays and lunar influences affect the labour of the farmer, so also is the work of the human soul affected by beneficent and maleficent forces in the universe. Every evil has its good counterpart in nature. The astral light in its lower aspect is devilish, but in its soul it is divine. This is the higher Astral Light or Akasha, the universal space in which lies inherent the eternal Ideation of the universe. Every time the human mind soars to the world of the universals it attracts to itself the purifying and elevating forces, which religions name angels, gods and divinities; contrariwise the mind's counsels are darkened by its association with the personal, the passional, and the beastly, which are named devils and demons. The former are the cause of inspiration, the latter of delusion.

Within the last two or three months we have noticed references to the mysterious legends which trace a weird connection between seals and men. In *The Manchester Guardian* (Jan. 20th.), Mr. Alasdair MacGregor recalls Fiona Macleod's "Song of the Seals". The Celts believed that the MacCodrums of North Uist were

seals under enchantment and that they came to the Hebrides as secret emissaries from the Courts of the Kings of Lochlann in the Land of Sleep. On the West Coast of Ireland, it is said, certain families are the direct descendants of seal folk. For instance, some members of the Coneely family were in the distant ages metamorphosed into seal men and seal women by "art magick". Mr. MacGregor quotes a folklorist who had investigated the traditions as current in Donegal up to the end of the nineteenth century: "Until lately the islanders of Aranmore could not be induced to attack a seal, they being strongly under the impression that these animals were human beings metamorphosed by the power of their own witchcraft." And now, in *The Golden Book Magazine* for March, is printed a story by John Masefield, the poet-laureate, entitled "The Sealman". In it an ancient dame relates certain instances of seal men, attested to by her father. We are told that when one, O'Donnell, died, his wraith walked to the beach and passed into a bull seal, "and the bull seal walked like a man at the change of the moon, like a big tall handsome man". This sealman wedded a mortal maid and their son was a sealman, a lovely child with hair like seal's fur. At night it might be seen playing with the seals in the sea. The boy grew up and in his turn fell in love. But tragedy was the doom of the maiden, for in her love she "went down into the sea with her man,

who wasn't a man at all," and was drowned.

What is the real meaning of these extraordinary traditions? They could not have persisted without having some basis of truth.

A melancholy interest attaches itself to the review-article on p. 340, by Dr. Sir Jivanji J. Modi, the venerable Parsi scholar who died on the 28th of March. Of academic distinctions he had many. France was particularly appreciative of his work, her Government nominating him in 1898 "Officier d'Académie," and in 1902 "Officier de l'Instruction Publique"; in 1925 he was the recipient of the distinction "Chevalier de la Légion d'Honneur". He was an honorary LL.D. of his own University of Bombay, a Ph.D. of Heidelberg University, while Sweden and Hungary also paid tribute to his scholarship. The Government of India bestowed on him the title of Shams-ul-Ulma, and in 1930 he received the honour of Knighthood. A great linguist, a voracious reader, an eloquent preacher, especially of Zoroastrian ethics, and a conscientious student, Sir Jivanji has written on a vast number of subjects, always learnedly, and often interestingly. He took a kindly interest in the *THE ARYAN PATH* and accorded to our representative an interview which appeared in January 1931 under the title of "Eastern and Western Cultures". In the July number of that year he wrote on "The Path—A Zoroastrian view."